This post was created using ChatGPT4 as an Intelligence Analysis Agent created by Scot Terban

Chinese influence campaigns in 2023 reveal a multifaceted and increasingly sophisticated approach employed by Beijing-linked actors. These efforts are aimed at disrupting democratic societies and shaping political narratives favorable to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Key findings from various reports and investigations include:

Scope and Evolution: The U.S. Intelligence Community’s 2023 Annual Threat Assessment emphasized the growing pervasiveness and sophistication of foreign states’ malign use of digital information, highlighting Chinese disinformation networks active since 2019. These networks have exploited political polarization, the COVID-19 pandemic, and other events to support China’s soft power agenda​​. Meta reported that it took down five coordinated influence networks from China, with one campaign involving 4,789 fake Facebook accounts focused on U.S. politics and China-related topics​​.

Commercial Involvement: A diverse range of commercial entities, from Chinese state-owned enterprises to Western AI companies, have been implicated in Chinese influence campaigns. For instance, Xi’an Tianwendian Network Technology and Shanghai Haixun played key roles in content dissemination and influence operations​​. Microsoft’s Threat Analysis Center discovered Chinese IO campaigns utilizing AI-generated images of U.S. symbols to undermine American democratic ideals​​.

Tactical Diversification: Chinese influence operations have expanded to a wider array of platforms, languages, and audiences. Networks previously focused on large platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube have now spread to TikTok, Reddit, Pinterest, and Medium, among others. This diversification suggests a strategic response to increased monitoring and removals by larger firms​​.

Generative AI and Disinformation: There is an emerging use of generative AI tools in creating and sharing content, such as AI-generated memes mimicking U.S. voters, to increase engagement and believability. This tactic has reportedly achieved success in garnering attention from real users​​.

Content Laundering and Deception: Sophisticated schemes have been employed to launder content, increasing its credibility while hiding its origins. For example, a fake research report claiming the U.S. government was concealing the origin of COVID-19 was disseminated across multiple platforms. Additionally, a Chinese public relations firm enlisted unwitting Americans to create content aligning with CCP narratives, further blurring the lines between genuine and manipulated content​​.

Smears and Incitement Tactics: Disinformation campaigns have focused on amplifying discord on key political and social issues and discrediting activists, journalists, and officials. This includes harassing U.S. journalists and discrediting political figures through coordinated campaigns on platforms like WeChat​​.

Future Outlook: Despite increasing exposure and attribution of these campaigns to Beijing, there is no indication that the Chinese regime plans to curb its manipulation efforts. In fact, it is likely gearing up for more aggressive activities around the 2024 presidential elections in the United States and Taiwan. The exposure of these tactics has highlighted the strengths and vulnerabilities in current democratic responses, underscoring the need for continued vigilance and adaptation to these evolving threats​​.

In summary, the 2023 Chinese influence campaigns exhibit a complex and adaptive approach, employing a range of tactics from AI-generated content to content laundering and targeting a broad spectrum of platforms and audiences. These efforts pose a significant challenge to democratic societies and require a multi-faceted response to counter their influence effectively.

Chinese Disinformation Examples 2023

The comprehensive assessment of Chinese influence campaigns in 2023 reveals an intricate web of disinformation and manipulation, marked by a significant expansion in scale, sophistication, and diversity of tactics. Several specific campaigns have been identified, each illustrating the evolving nature of these operations:

Meta’s Takedown of a Massive Spam Network: Meta dismantled a large-scale covert influence operation, which is considered the largest known cross-platform covert operation globally. This network, originating from China, targeted multiple regions worldwide, including Australia, the U.S., UK, Japan, and Taiwan. It involved nearly 9,000 Facebook and Instagram accounts, pages, and groups, actively spreading content on more than 50 platforms and forums. The content included criticisms of Western foreign policies, flattering commentary about China, and critiques of journalists and activists critical of the Chinese government​​.

Spamouflage Campaign: First identified by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) and further analyzed by Graphika, Google’s Threat Analysis Group, and Mandiant, this campaign, known as “Spamouflage,” utilized hijacked or fake accounts on platforms like YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook. It was primarily aimed at supporting the Chinese government and discrediting its critics, notably during the Hong Kong protests in 2019. This network was linked to individuals associated with Chinese law enforcement​​.

Microsoft’s Discovery of State-Linked Influencers: Microsoft identified at least 230 Chinese state media employees or affiliates masquerading as independent commentators across multiple platforms, reaching 103 million people in 40 different languages. This network expanded to new languages and platforms, such as Vimeo, Tumblr, and Quora, employing both human influencers and automated accounts​​.

AI-Generated Content and Exploitation of Popular Hashtags: There has been an emerging use of generative AI tools in creating content, such as memes mimicking U.S. voters, shared across social media. These AI-generated memes have focused on divisive topics like gun violence and the Black Lives Matter movement in the U.S. Unattributed images have also been used to avoid detection of links to Chinese state media. In one case, networks replenished their ranks by purchasing fake personas from criminal organizations in Southeast Asia​​.

Content Laundering and Utilization of Proxy Entities: A notable instance involved a 66-page “research report” claiming that the U.S. government concealed the origin of COVID-19. The document was published and promoted across various platforms, significantly obfuscating its origins. Additionally, a Chinese PR firm enlisted Americans to create content aligning with CCP narratives, which was then published on legitimate news website domains​​.

Harassment and Smear Campaigns: The network active on Meta platforms targeted journalists, political commentators, and occasionally elected officials in the U.S. for harassment or discrediting. A campaign on Tencent’s WeChat platform was involved in smearing a Canadian Parliament member critical of China. Such campaigns also targeted think tanks and NGOs investigating CCP’s disinformation and transnational repression efforts​​.

These examples underscore the adaptability and reach of Beijing’s disinformation campaigns. Despite increasing exposure and attribution to Beijing, there is no indication of a reduction in these efforts.

On the contrary, the Chinese regime seems to be preparing for more aggressive activities, particularly with the upcoming 2024 presidential elections in the U.S. and Taiwan​​. This evolving threat landscape demands a nuanced and robust response to safeguard the integrity of democratic societies against such covert operations.