Algorithmic Contract Design: What to Know About Agents With Unknown Disutilites
2024-5-3 08:24:15 Author: hackernoon.com(查看原文) 阅读量:0 收藏

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Algorithmic Contract Design: What to Know About Agents With Unknown Disutilites  by@browserology

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This paper is available on arxiv under CC 4.0 license. Authors: Kiriaki Frangias, Andrew Lin, Ellen Vitercik, Manolis Zampetakis. The principal controls the number of incentivized agents only through the payment function. The full proofs of all results are in Appendix C.

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