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Advisory ID:               SYSS-2024-041
Product:                   DiCal-RED
Manufacturer:              Swissphone Wireless AG
Affected Version(s):       Unknown
Tested Version(s):         4009
Vulnerability Type:        Use of Unmaintained Third Party Components (CWE-1104)
Risk Level:                High
Solution Status:           Open
Manufacturer Notification: 2024-04-16
Solution Date:             None
Public Disclosure:         2024-08-20
CVE Reference:             CVE-2016-5195, CVE-2016-7406, CVE-2019-12815 and others
Author of Advisory:        Sebastian Hamann, SySS GmbH

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Overview:

DiCal-RED is a radio module for communication between emergency vehicles and
control rooms. It provides Ethernet, Wi-Fi and cellular network connectivity
and runs a Linux- and BusyBox-based operating system.

The manufacturer describes the product as follows (see [1]):

"The DiCal-Red radio data module reliably guides you to your destination. This
is ensured by the linking of navigation (also for the transmission of position
data) and various radio modules."

Due to the use of unmaintained third-party software components, the device is
vulnerable to numerous known security issues.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Vulnerability Details:

The device's operating system is based on several well-known open-source
products, such as the Linux kernel, the Dropbear SSH server and the
ProFTPD FTP server.

In particular, it runs the following versions:

 Product      | Version | Released
 -------------|---------|--------------
 Linux kernel | 3.14.35 | March 2015
 Dropbear     | 2013.56 | March 2013
 ProFTPD      |  1.3.3g | November 2011

There are several publicly known security issues that affect these software
versions, such as CVE-2016-5195, CVE-2016-7406 or CVE-2019-12815.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Proof of Concept (PoC):

None

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Solution:

The manufacturer recommends not running the device in an untrusted network.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Disclosure Timeline:

2024-02-29: Vulnerability discovered
2024-04-16: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
2024-05-10: Manufacturer states that the vulnerability will not be fixed
2024-05-14: Vulnerability reported to CERT-Bund
2024-08-13: CERT-Bund informs us that the vendor declared the product EOL
2024-08-20: Public disclosure of vulnerability

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

References:

[1] Product website for DiCal-RED
    https://www.swissphone.com/solutions/components/terminals/radio-data-module-dical-red/
[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2024-041
    https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2024-041.txt
[3] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
    https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Credits:

This security vulnerability was found by Sebastian Hamann of SySS GmbH.

E-Mail: sebastian.hamann () syss de
Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Sebastian_Hamann.asc
Key ID: 0x9CE0E440429D8B96
Key Fingerprint: F643 DF21 62C4 7C53 7DB2 8BA1 9CE0 E440 429D 8B96

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Disclaimer:

The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is"
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Copyright:

Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0
URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en

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