Iranian state-backed actors operating under aliases like “Pioneer Kitten” are increasingly targeting critical infrastructure – and expanding their activities into brokering access for ransomware affiliates.
They move silently across networks, leveraging every vulnerability left unpatched, exploiting gaps with surgical precision. The group of Iran-based threat actors—active since at least 2017—has become a persistent and formidable threat, targeting U.S. organizations across vital sectors such as education, finance, healthcare, and defense. These cybercriminals aren’t just isolated hackers; they operate with a level of sophistication that suggests state sponsorship, and their ultimate goals are far-reaching and deeply concerning.
The FBI, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3) have issued a joint advisory warning about these Iran-based actors. Their operations reveal a dual purpose: monetizing network access by collaborating with ransomware affiliates and engaging in espionage activities aligned with Iranian government interests. U.S. organizations, particularly those in critical infrastructure, are urged to take action and bolster their defenses.
The threat group, known by various names like “Pioneer Kitten,” “Fox Kitten,” “Lemon Sandstorm,” and more recently, “xplfinder,” has demonstrated adaptability in its tactics. From exploiting vulnerabilities in widely used network devices to selling domain control privileges on dark web marketplaces, they have continuously evolved their methods to stay ahead of defensive measures.
Their modus operandi involves not just gaining access but maintaining it—often for future ransomware attacks. They offer full domain control to ransomware groups like ALPHV (also known as BlackCat) and NoEscape, receiving a cut from the ransom payments. These actors are not only gatekeepers to compromised networks but active participants in planning and executing ransomware campaigns.
The group’s tactics extend beyond traditional cybercrime. In some instances, they’ve conducted hack-and-leak operations, where they publicly expose sensitive information to destabilize and pressure their targets. The Pay2Key campaign in 2020, which targeted Israeli organizations, is one such example. By leaking stolen data on the dark web and tagging media outlets, they aimed to cause reputational damage rather than secure a ransom, signaling a strategic shift towards information warfare.
In addition to Israel, Azerbaijan and the UAE have also been targets.
The threat actors’ methods are mapped meticulously to the MITRE ATT&CK framework—a widely recognized matrix that categorizes cyberattack tactics and techniques. Initial intrusions often occur through internet-facing assets like firewalls and VPNs, with the group exploiting known vulnerabilities such as CVE-2024-3400 in Palo Alto Networks’ PAN-OS. Once inside, they use tools like Shodan to identify vulnerable devices and deploy webshells to capture credentials, laying the groundwork for deeper infiltration.
The TAs have also mastered persistence by deploying backdoors and creating new user accounts, often masquerading as legitimate services. Their ability to evade detection and maintain long-term access makes them particularly dangerous, as they can strike at any time, often when least expected.
The FBI and CISA advisory provides a detailed list of indicators of compromise (IOCs) and recommendations for mitigating the threat posed by these actors. Organizations are urged to apply patches for known vulnerabilities immediately and review their logs for signs of compromise, particularly looking for outbound traffic to suspicious domains. The use of tools like NGROK for tunneling and Ligolo for maintaining remote access requires constant network scrutiny to detect unauthorized activities.
The evolving tactics of these Iran-based cyber actors highlight the growing complexity and danger of cyber threats today. Organizations in the U.S. and allied countries must not only defend against ransomware but also be prepared for state-sponsored espionage and information warfare. As the line between criminal and nation-state activities blurs, the stakes for cybersecurity have never been higher.
For those in critical sectors, the time to act is now.
See Table 1 to Table 9 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques.
1. Reconnaissance | ||
Technique Title | ID | Use or Assessed Use |
Search Open Technical Databases | T1596 | Iranian cyber actors use Shodan (Shodan[.]io) to identify internet infrastructure hosting devices vulnerable to particular CVEs. |
2. Initial Access | ||
Technique Title | ID | Use or Assessed Use |
Exploit Public-Facing Application | T1190 | Iranian cyber actors scan and exploit public-facing networking devices, including the following devices and associated CVEs: Citrix Netscaler (CVEs-2019-19781 and CVE-2023-3519) F5 BIG-IP (CVE-2022-1388) Pulse Secure/Ivanti VPNs (CVE-2024-21887) PanOS firewalls (CVE-2024-3400) Check Point Security Gateways (CVE-2024-24919) |
External Remote Services | T1133 | Iranian cyber actors create /xui/common/images/ directory on targeted IP addresses. |
3. Persistence | ||
Technique Title | ID | Use or Assessed Use |
Server Software Component: Web Shell | T1505.003 | Iranian cyber actors capture login credentials on compromised Netscaler devices via deployed webshell; create a directory on Netscaler devices for webshell deployment; deploy webshells on compromised Netscaler devices in two directories (observed closely after system owning patching); and place the malicious backdoor version.dll. |
Create Account (Local Account) | T1136.001 | Iranian cyber actors create local accounts on victim networks. |
Account Manipulation | T1098 | Iranian cyber actors request exemptions to zero-trust application for tools they intend to deploy. |
Scheduled Task/Job | T1053 | Iranian cyber actors implement a scheduled task that uses a DLL side-loading technique and a scheduled task that loads malware through back doors. |
Server Software Component | T1505 | Iranian cyber actors implement the daily creation of a Windows service task for persistence as detection and mitigation occur. |
4. Privilege Escalation | ||
Technique Title | ID | Use or Assessed Use |
Valid Accounts: Local Accounts | T1078.003 | Iranian cyber actors repurpose compromised credentials (e.g., from a Netscaler device) to log into other applications. |
Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts | T1078.002 | Iranian cyber actors repurpose administrative credentials of network admins to log into domain controllers and other infrastructure. |
5. Defense Evasion | ||
Technique Title | ID | Use or Assessed Use |
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools | T1562.001 | Iranian cyber actors use administrator credentials to disable antivirus and security software. |
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools | T1562.001 | Iranian cyber actors attempt to enter security exemption tickets to the network security device or contractor to get their tools allowlisted. |
Impair Defenses: Downgrade Attack | T1562.010 | Iranian cyber actors lower PowerShell policies to a less secure level. |
6. Credential Access | ||
Technique Title | ID | Use or Assessed Use |
Input Capture | T1056 | Iranian cyber actors capture login credentials on compromised Netscaler devices via a deployed webshell. |
7. Execution | ||
Technique Title | ID | Use or Assessed Use |
Command and Scripting | T1059.001 | Iranian cyber actors use an admin account to initiate a remote desktop session to start Microsoft Windows PowerShell ISE. |
Command and Scripting Interpreter | T1059.001 | Iranian cyber actors enable servers to use Windows PowerShell Web Access. |
8. Discovery | ||
Technique Title | ID | Use or Assessed Use |
Query Registry | T1012 | Iranian cyber actors export registry hives and network firewall configurations. |
Domain Trust Discovery | T1482 | Iranian cyber actors exfiltrate account usernames from the domain controller and access configuration files and logs. |
9. Command and Control | ||
Technique Title | ID | Use or Assessed Use |
Remote Access Software | T1219 | Iranian cyber actors install “AnyDesk” remote access program. Iranian cyber actors deploy Meshcentral to connect with compromised servers for remote access. |
Protocol Tunneling | T1572 | Iranian cyber actors use ligolo / ligolo-ng for open source tunneling and ngrok[.]io NGROK to create outbound connections to a random subdomain. |
List of public-facing networking devices exploited and associated CVEs:
Check for unauthorized install of:
IP Address and Domain Identifiers
The IP addresses and domains listed below were observed in use by the threat actors in the specified timeframes in 2024.
Recent IOCs | ||
Indicator | First Seen | Most Recently Observed Date |
138.68.90[.]19 | January 2024 | August 2024 |
167.99.202[.]130 | January 2024 | August 2024 |
78.141.238[.]182 | July 2024 | August 2024 |
51.16.51[.]81 | January 2024 | August 2024 |
51.20.138[.]134 | February 2024 | August 2024 |
134.209.30[.]220 | March 2024 | August 2024 |
13.53.124[.]246 | February 2024 | August 2024 |
api.gupdate[.]net | September 2022 | August 2024 |
githubapp[.]net | February 2024 | August 2024 |
The table below reflects historical IP addresses and domains associated with these actors.
Historical IOCs | ||
Indicator | First Seen | Most Recently Observed Date |
18.134.0[.]66 | September 2023 | November 2023 |
193.149.190[.]248 | September 2023 | January 2024 |
45.76.65[.]42 | September 2023 | December 2023 |
206.71.148[.]78 | October 2023 | January 2024 |
193.149.187[.]41 | October 2023 | November 2023 |
login.forticloud[.]online | October 2023 | November 2023 |
fortigate.forticloud[.]online | October 2023 | November 2023 |
cloud.sophos[.]one | October 2023 | November 2023 |
The FBI also listed the bitcoin addresses linked to the Iranian threat actors: