The chatter about hypothetical election vulnerabilities is overwhelming, drowning out the real threats to our democracy. As a veteran cybersecurity expert, I’ve seen firsthand that the most significant risk to our electoral system isn’t some high-tech flaw. It’s far more dangerous: the erosion of public trust, driven by political grandstanding and disinformation.
Most of the vulnerabilities hyped by the media and political operatives are hypothetical at best and absurd at worst. But here’s the real danger — this very noise is our electoral system’s greatest threat. When political actors who are responsible for the standards, laws, and funding of our elections start attacking the system, it’s like watching a builder destroy their own foundation. Trust, the bedrock of democracy, is the first casualty.
This goes far beyond voter apathy. Americans are being fed a steady diet of disinformation about the electoral process, and they’re taking active measures to disrupt it. Frivolous lawsuits, voter intimidation and efforts to undermine the democratic process are becoming disturbingly common. This is a powder keg of distrust, ready to explode.
From my military background, I know the devastating effects of psychological warfare — sowing doubt and discord within a population. Now, we’re seeing these tactics deployed against our own electoral system. The consequences are not just theoretical — they are immediate and real.
Politicians are actively sowing the seeds of doubt, and extreme factions are more than willing to water them with aggressive actions aimed at disrupting or destroying the machinery of democracy itself. This is no longer just rhetoric — it’s an active threat.
While technology and cybersecurity can certainly help build trust in our elections, they can’t fix the root problem. The biggest threats we face today aren’t technological —t hey’re behavioral. And the only way to address them is through responsible action from our elected leaders.
America has relied on a decentralized election system since 1789, when the Constitution empowered counties to conduct elections. The security benefit of this setup is the distribution of risk across a diverse and large number of independent actors. To hack the system, you would have to hack them all — or at least a substantial number of them.
Critics argue that we should modernize this 235-year-old structure, but they forget that the Constitution is 236 years old and still holds up well. Additionally, decentralization is one of the biggest architectural trends in modern security. Whether by design or accident, our Founding Fathers were ahead of their time in creating a resilient system.
The main risk of centralization is simple: One central source for all votes creates an enormous target for bad actors. Centralization equates to massive concentration risk for the entire system.
Inter-agency intelligence sharing may be at its worst in American history. Agencies like the NSA, CIA, FBI and DOD produce and consume intelligence but have no standard interface or contact with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) or state and county election boards. The FEC’s narrow focus on campaign integrity — rather than election security — demonstrates Congress’s lack of interest in truly securing elections. Even if the FEC were given intelligence on election threats, its mandate only covers the integrity of election campaigns, not the actual election processes.
If our elected officials were serious about securing elections, they would pass legislation to standardize election practices, ballot language, voter registration and voting processes nationwide. Changing the electoral structure would likely require a Constitutional amendment, but creating a federally led framework to ensure a trustworthy process — from registration to ballot counting — has always been an option. So, are they too lazy to do their jobs, or do political parties benefit from criticizing a system they refuse to fix?
Political pundits love to repeat the tired trope that “humans are the weakest link” in cybersecurity. Regardless of the age, era or form of government, humans have always been the weakest link in any societal structure or process. Whether discussing cybersecurity today or medieval gateguards, humans have always been the most exploitable surface.
What those same politically motivated voices fail to acknowledge, however, is that humans are also the strongest part of security. From Alan Turing to the Navajo Code Talkers, to individuals reporting suspicious activities on the subway or in parking lots, humans are key to security. Elections aren’t run by a single person who could be a “weak link”; they are managed by thousands of poll workers, election board members, technologists, and tabulators.
To believe what some political actors are selling, you must believe that the election system is so fragile that one individual could bring the entire structure crashing down. Years of research and study show no such findings about our election system, nor any evidence of serious fraud or vulnerabilities at that level.
Rather than buying into unfounded claims of how fragile our election technology is, perhaps we should recognize its proven strengths and focus on improving from there.
I can see a future where immutable ledgers or blockchain technologies could make election results unquestionable, where advanced identity verification finally allows for the unique identification of every U.S. citizen, and where technology standards are implemented nationwide to ensure consistency across all 50 states.
But none of these advancements will come to fruition unless Congress embraces innovation and fulfills its Constitutionally mandated role of governing. Congress could address many of the criticisms of our electoral system before the next presidential election. Yet, they have shown little interest in doing so. Instead, they would rather fight than fix.
The technology to secure our elections already exists. What we lack is the political will to implement it.
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